




Llywodraeth Cymru  
Welsh Government

# Welsh Government Contingency Plan for Exotic Notifiable Diseases of Animals 2018





## Foreword by the Cabinet Secretary for Energy, Planning and Rural Affairs



Agriculture in Wales is a major contributor to our economy and if it is to grow and thrive the environment must be right for it to develop. High standards of animal health and welfare are essential to that process assisting the drive for national prosperity.

As a Government we are committed to our national strategy of Prosperity for All. Aspiring to high standards of animal health and welfare is a fundamental requirement of a civilised society with all kept animals being treated with care, dignity and respect. By maintaining good animal health and welfare we can contribute towards a number of our obligations such as improvement of our resilience to notifiable exotic animal diseases.

It is not possible to predict when an exotic notifiable animal disease will re-emerge despite procedures being in place to monitor threats from overseas, extensive surveillance and undertaking regular veterinary risk assessments.

The threat of avian influenza from wild birds is widely recognised and in January 2017, Wales had a confirmed case in poultry in Carmarthenshire, one of 13 Infected Premises in Great Britain. This was accompanied by many findings of disease in a variety of species of wild birds, particularly waterfowl. Similarly in 2018, there were findings in wild birds but fortunately no cases in poultry and a Prevention Zone was declared in January and lifted in May. I am confident if it had not been for bird keepers taking action to protect their flocks with improved biosecurity, the extent of the outbreak last year could have been far worse. However, high standards of biosecurity should not be restricted to an outbreak but should form part of everyday good practice.

We have not had a major animal disease outbreak in Wales for a number of years, however, it remains vitally important we are prepared and have effective mechanisms in place to deal with the impact.

In the light of the UK exiting the European Union (EU), we must work with everyone affected to prepare for a world outside of the EU and for a resilient agriculture sector.

I am pleased to introduce this updated version of the Welsh Government Contingency Plan - Exotic Diseases of Animals 2018. This plan is an integral part of the Welsh Government's commitment to preparedness for an exotic animal disease.

**Lesley Griffiths AM**  
**Cabinet Secretary for Energy, Planning and Rural Affairs**

 Follow the Cabinet Secretary for Environment and Rural Affairs on Twitter @WGCS\_Enviro

## Foreword by the Chief Veterinary Officer for Wales



The Wales Animal Health and Welfare Framework sets out our vision for improving animal health and welfare standards for all kept animals, protecting public health and making a contribution to the economy.

Exotic disease is a constant threat to the livestock, poultry and captive bird sectors in Wales and an outbreak can have a devastating effect on industry, rural communities and the economy of Wales. As part of my role I ensure there are effective contingency plans in place and we maintain a state of readiness to deal with animal disease to minimise the impact, contain disease spread and eradicate disease quickly to enable recovery.

This updated plan takes account of organisational changes across government, updated animal disease policies, lessons from recent disease events and improvements identified from exercises. The plan complements the UK Contingency Plan for Exotic Notifiable Diseases of Animals.

The effectiveness of this Contingency Plan depends on how quickly the first incident of disease can be identified. Government vets monitor the global disease picture and conduct surveillance to identify threats quickly and ensure an effective response to a disease outbreak. However, this activity must be supported by vigilance on the part of all animal keepers who will have regular contact with their animals and are in the best position to notice any changes in their health or behaviour. Keepers should regularly inspect their animals, looking for anything unusual. If animal keepers, with advice from their private vets, suspect a notifiable animal disease they should act quickly and notify the Animal and Plant Health Agency (0300 303 8268). Detecting a disease early is vitally important in limiting spread.

Animal keepers should maintain high levels of biosecurity to protect their livestock. The smallest detail can have a real benefit, whether it is ensuring clothing and vehicles are clean to maintaining field boundaries, repairing breaches along with making informed livestock purchasing decisions. Improved biosecurity together with vigilance are important in protecting animals in Wales from disease

We will continue to work in partnership with the farming industry, veterinary profession, operational partners and other stakeholders as their advice and support is essential in ensuring the risk and impact of animal disease are minimised.

I am very pleased to introduce the Welsh Government Contingency Plan - Exotic Diseases of Animals 2018.

**Professor Christianne Glossop**  
**Chief Veterinary Officer for Wales**

 Follow the Chief Veterinary Officer for Wales on Twitter @CVOWales

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# 1.Introduction

1.1 The Welsh Government considers that aspiring to high standards of animal health and welfare is a fundamental requirement of a civilised society i.e. all kept animals should be treated with care, dignity and respect. By maintaining good animal health and welfare we can contribute towards:

- Improvement of our resilience to notifiable exotic animal diseases
- Optimisation of performance and productivity
- Promotion of food quality, safety and security
- Protection of public health
- Meeting consumer / customer expectations
- Meeting farmers expectations
- Protection of the environment

1.2 The health and welfare of animals not only concerns owners of livestock or government but society as a whole. The cost to government of the outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease in GB in 2001 was exceptionally high at £3 billion. There have been several major notifiable exotic animal disease outbreaks since 2001, including Foot and Mouth Disease, Avian Influenza and Bluetongue with costs to government of around £47 million, with consequential impacts on other economic sectors.

1.3 Section 14A of the [Animal Health Act 1981](#) (as amended) requires contingency plans to be in place, which should be regularly reviewed and revised as necessary. This Contingency Plan, complemented by Disease Control Strategies ensures compliance with these legislative requirements.

1.4 The following disease control strategies cover the exotic diseases of most concern.

- [Notifiable Avian Disease Control Strategy for Great Britain;](#)
- [Foot and Mouth Disease Control Strategy for Great Britain;](#)
- [Rabies Disease Control Strategy for England and Wales;](#)
- [The GB Bluetongue Virus Control Strategy;](#)
- [Disease Control Strategy for African and Classical Swine Fever for Great Britain;](#)
- [African Horse Sickness Control Strategy for Great Britain.](#)
- [Lumpy Skin Disease Control Strategy for Great Britain](#)

1.5 The control strategies were developed building on the expertise and experience of government, operational partners and stakeholders working together to prevent and stamp out disease as quickly as possible. For diseases with no published control strategy, legislation is in place for use in an outbreak.

1.6 This plan sets out the organisation and systems necessary to respond to a notifiable exotic animal disease outbreak, including the roles and responsibilities of government, stakeholders and operational partners.



1.7 If a notifiable exotic animal disease is confirmed in Wales the Welsh Government will act swiftly and decisively to:

- Eradicate the disease and regain disease free status;
- Protect the health and safety of the public and those directly involved in controlling the outbreak
- Minimise the burden on the taxpayer and public as well as the economic impact of the outbreak on industry.

1.8 The Welsh Government will endeavour to:

- Keep to a minimum the number of animals that die or need to be humanely destroyed for disease control purposes
- Safeguard animal welfare.
- Minimise adverse impacts on animal welfare, the rural and wider economy, the public, rural communities and the environment.

1.9 [England](#), [Scotland](#) and [Northern Ireland](#) also maintain contingency plans, and together with the disease control strategies fulfil the UK's current obligations to the European Commission and Office International des Epizooties (OIE) (the World Organisation for Animal Health).

1.10 In addition, the [United Kingdom Contingency Plan for Exotic Notifiable Diseases of Animals](#) (republished in 2015) provides a strategic overview of the structures and systems necessary to deal with an outbreak of disease in the UK. The plan demonstrates how the governments would work together in an outbreak.

## 2. Preparedness

2.1 An exotic animal disease outbreak could happen at any time and we must all be prepared. Many factors may be responsible for the introduction and spread of disease, such as the import of infected animals and animal products, the migratory patterns of wild birds, insects and other vectors, the weather and climate change.

2.2 Although legislation is in place to safeguard and regulate the trade in animals and animal products, there is no guarantee against an outbreak occurring and so it is essential that we continue to monitor, plan and prepare.

2.3 Dealing with a disease outbreak requires an effective partnership between animal keepers, the veterinary profession, industry and government. Vigilance is essential for the swift identification and eradication of animal disease.

### Animal Keepers

2.4 All animal keepers are responsible for the health and welfare of their animals, which should be checked regularly for any signs of disease, and good biosecurity practices maintained. Concerns should be raised with their private veterinary surgeon immediately and if a notifiable animal disease is suspected it must be reported to the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) in Wales on 0300 303 8268 for investigation.



2.5 The Welsh Government has developed [biosecurity guidance](#) to support animal keepers. It is recommended that all livestock keepers develop their own contingency plans for when disease is suspected or confirmed.

2.6 There are also a number of industry led initiatives to assist keepers to improve their biosecurity. For example, [the Red Tractor Code of Practice for On-Farm Feeding](#), the [British Lion Code of Practice](#) and the [equine industry guides for owners](#).

## **The Welsh Government**

2.7 The Office of the Chief Veterinary Officer (OCVO) is responsible for developing and maintaining animal disease policy and contingency plans in Wales.

2.8 OCVO works closely with APHA, which leads on operational delivery in a notifiable exotic animal disease outbreak in GB.

2.9 The Welsh Government maintains close links with Defra, the Scottish Government (SG), the Department of Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs for Northern Ireland (DAERA) and with operational partners such as Local Authorities (LA), Veterinary Delivery Partners (VDP), Local Resilience Forums (LRFs), Public Health Wales (PHW), Food Standards Agency (FSA), the Police and Natural Resources Wales (NRW) to ensure our response is well planned, integrated and coordinated.

2.10 APHA engage with local and GB operational partners and stakeholders as part of their on-going emergency preparedness and include them in the planning and implementation of local and GB/UK exercises.

## **Disease monitoring**

2.11 Defra monitors the [international disease situation](#) and publishes monthly International Disease Monitoring (IDM) reports, as well as preliminary outbreak assessments for each disease if there is a new outbreak in another country. Defra also publish qualitative risk assessments when there is a new disease incident in Europe, or other overseas trading partners. If a significant risk is identified, government will discuss with relevant stakeholders and may put in place additional risk mitigation measures to address livestock industry or public health concerns, including additional surveillance or post import testing.

2.12 The World Animal Health Information Database ([WAHIS](#)) also provides information of interest to stakeholders, such as disease reports, by country.

2.13 When disease is not present in the country, controls need to be proportionate to the risk. By monitoring the international situation the option to vary preventative controls is considered against the changing threats. Government works closely with other agencies to deliver proportionate controls at borders.

## Emergency planning and operational instructions

2.14 APHA ensures it is prepared to respond to a notifiable exotic animal disease outbreak or incident.

2.15 The Head of Field Delivery Wales (HoFD) is responsible for ensuring local preparedness to deal with disease outbreaks, that plans are in place and APHA staff are suitably trained and have the necessary skills. They are also responsible for maintaining effective relationships with the local livestock sectors and local operational partners (e.g. Resilience Fora, Police, Local Authorities, Public Health Wales and Natural Resources Wales).

2.16 APHA's Resilience & Technical Advisors (R&TAs) in consultation with other senior managers are responsible for maintaining local plans and procedures and advising the management team on all matters related to readiness and resilience.

2.17 Their primary responsibilities include:

- Ensuring that Wales is always at the required state of readiness to respond to an outbreak, and has the resilience to deal with animal disease emergencies and situations where animal welfare is in jeopardy as a consequence of other types of emergency
- Developing and maintaining local plans and procedures for responding to outbreaks and incidents of exotic notifiable diseases in animals or other disruptive challenges
- Overseeing the development of appropriate skills within field teams to ensure resilience, capability and capacity to effectively invoke and implement emergency response plans.
- Maintaining close links with and be the initial point of contact for operational partners, including LRFs.

## Local Emergency Planning

2.18 APHA is fully engaged in all aspects of emergency planning and incident response for notifiable exotic animal disease outbreaks. Their main objectives are to ensure that roles and responsibilities are fully understood and disease control systems are aligned with the well-established emergency response structures required to manage the wider consequences of an outbreak.

2.19 The principal mechanism for multi-agency co-operation under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 is through Local Resilience Forums (LRFs). Although APHA is not a statutory responder under the Act, in practice LRF membership includes APHA. APHA actively engages with individual responders and LRF Chairs to maintain and develop strong links.

2.20 The LRF brings together all the statutory responders, with specific duties defined under the [Civil Contingencies Act](#), within a local Police area for the purpose of facilitating co-operation to fulfil their duties under the Act. The LRF does not have

a separate legal identity, powers to direct their members or an incident management role, although the chair often becomes the chair of the Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) if one is formed. LRFs and SCGs have an important role in managing the wider consequences of animal disease outbreaks or incidents.

2.21 The purpose of the LRF is to ensure effective coordination of those duties under the Act that need to be developed in a multi-agency environment. In particular, the LRF process includes:

- A compilation of agreed risk profiles for the area, through a Community Risk Register;
- A systematic, planned and co-ordinated approach encouraging statutory responders, according to their functions, to address all aspects of policy in relation to:
  - planning for emergencies
  - planning for business continuity management
  - publishing information about risk assessments and plans;
  - arrangements to warn and inform the public;
  - other aspects of the civil protection duty, (including the promotion of business continuity management by LAs); and
  - support for the preparation, by some or all, of its members of multi-agency plans and other documents, including protocols and agreements and the co-ordination of multi-agency exercises and other training events.

2.22 The [National Risk Register](#) provides further details of the exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak risks which LRFs need to review and assess the local impacts. The risks assessed as being significant will need to be included within the Community Risk Registers. APHA is engaged in this process and can help with information on the density of livestock and with assessing the impacts on local communities.

## **Wales Resilience Forum**

2.23 Supporting the work of LRFs in Wales is the Wales Resilience Forum (WRF), which is chaired by the First Minister for Wales. Its aim is to promote good communication and enhance resilience across agencies and services in Wales. This is achieved by providing a forum for Chief Officers to discuss with Welsh Ministers strategic issues of emergency preparedness. On 24<sup>th</sup> May 2018 Executive Functions under Part 1 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 transferred to Welsh Ministers. This now allows Welsh Ministers to play a more influential role in civil contingencies.

2.24 The Chief Veterinary Officer Wales (CVO (W)) is a permanent member of the WRF who leads on any animal health issues.

2.25 The terms of reference for the WRF are:

- To create a forum for strategic guidance on resilience issues affecting Wales;

- To consider the UK Government / Welsh Government policy guidance and to advise on the implementation in Wales where appropriate;
- To facilitate mutual aid arrangements and joined up working;
- To provide direction and strategic leadership to the Wales Resilience Partnership Team and its sub-groups;
- To map resilience at the pan-Wales level, identify gaps and facilitate preparedness activity;
- To raise, consider and discuss issues of resilience in Wales with the UK Government; and
- To support cross-boundary working and information sharing.

## **Operational Instructions**

2.26 APHA have well developed operational instructions for use by staff involved in the response to an outbreak of exotic notifiable animal disease. They provide direction and guidance on the many tasks involved in the outbreak response, ensuring a consistent approach. Operational instructions are regularly reviewed and updated. They reflect current best practice for dealing with a disease investigation and outbreak response.

## **Equipment & Stores**

2.27 APHA Weybridge has stores of equipment to enable the agency to carry out its routine duties within defined time limits of resupply. The normal stock levels at Weybridge provide for the initial requirements of an animal disease outbreak until emergency contracts with key suppliers take effect.

2.28 APHA also has a GB network of stores facilities at a number of offices that hold or have immediate access to sufficient equipment to deal with disease cases in the first 48 hours, including provision for equipping additional veterinary personnel. Designated local staff manage stock levels with day-to-day responsibility for monitoring availability and serviceability of stores. A stock control system is in place to provide mutual support across APHA regions/offices.

## **Laboratory Capacity**

2.29 The Disease Emergency Response Committee (DERC) has a specific remit to ensure that sufficient laboratory facilities for the diagnosis and surveillance of exotic notifiable animal diseases are available during outbreaks and other surges in demand. Representation is from APHA, the Pirbright Institute, Defra, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Where APHA has national laboratory responsibility for screening and or confirmatory testing for the disease in question, or where testing for specified diseases has been delegated to APHA by the National Reference Laboratory, a Laboratory Emergency Response Team will be commissioned to coordinate and implement the laboratory contingency plans.

2.30 APHA Weybridge provides the diagnostic and surveillance testing service for a number of exotic notifiable diseases and is the National Reference Laboratory for Newcastle Disease, Avian Influenza, Rabies, Classical Swine Fever, Equine

Infectious Anaemia, Equine Encephalomyelitis, Contagious Agalactia, West Nile Virus, Dourine and Glanders.

2.31 The Pirbright Institute is the National Reference Laboratory for FMD, African swine fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Bluetongue, Peste des Petits Ruminants (PPR), Rinderpest, several ruminant poxviruses and African Horse Sickness.

2.32 Contingency surge capacity testing, for a disease outbreak, is provided by APHA Weybridge. Serological testing capacity is provided on a contingency basis of up to a maximum 120,000 samples per week. The laboratory would be ready to start contingency surge capacity testing within four days of notification with an initial capacity of 5,000 tests in week 1, 10,000 tests in week 2, 20,000 tests in week 3, 25,000 tests in week 4 and building to full capacity of 120,000 tests per week at week 8.

## **Staff Resources**

### **Government Veterinary Resources**

2.33 Veterinary staff from APHA, Defra, and the Welsh Government will provide the initial emergency response capability.

### **Non-government Veterinary Personnel**

2.34 As part of the Veterinary Delivery Partnership (VDP) contract, 100 experienced Official Veterinarians (OVs) are available to support the outbreak response. In the event of an outbreak, these OVs would be called upon immediately to undertake roles that would otherwise be undertaken by permanent APHA veterinary staff.

2.35 Non-government veterinary personnel may also be engaged on temporary contracts to work as APHA veterinary inspectors. This may include private veterinary practitioners and retired government veterinarians.

### **Overseas government veterinary and technical staff**

2.36 The International Animal Health Emergency Reserve (IAHER) agreement, re-signed in 2016, with the Republic of Ireland, United States of America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand to provide veterinary and technical staff in the event of an outbreak of disease. Assistance may also be sought from EU Member States and is arranged by means of contracts between the relevant CVOs.

### **Technical, Administrative and Policy Staff**

2.37 Staff from APHA, the Welsh Government, Defra and other UK Government departments will provide the initial emergency response capability. OCVO staff will take up posts within the Emergency Co-ordination Centre (Wales) (ECC (W)) in Cardiff. In addition, Welsh Government staff from Agriculture, Food and Marine Department and the Civil Contingency volunteer list are available to provide administrative support for the ECC (W), National Disease Control Centre (NDCC)

and the Forward Operations Base (FOB). If additional field staff are needed Field Officers from the Rural Inspectorate Wales may also be available and others via the VDP.

2.38 APHA has systems in place that provide the means to identify personnel who have appropriate veterinary, technical and administrative skills and experience of disease outbreaks

2.39 NDCC HR, in conjunction with Defra Strategic HR, will lead on coordinating staff deployments for APHA in response to needs.

2.40 For the Welsh Government staff working in an outbreak the Economy, Skills and Natural Resources Finance and Operations Team will provide advice and guidance to ensure an appropriate level of duty of care is applied to the staff involved.

2.41 If necessary, Defra will trigger the use of the cross-government Memorandum of Understanding on Mutual Aid and the Redeployment of Human Resources. This relates to the loan of staff from other Government departments (OGD).

## **Training**

### **Welsh Government**

2.42 All Welsh Government staff expected to be engaged in an exotic animal disease outbreak will be given awareness sessions on this plan, encouraged to attend events and take part in exercises.

### **APHA**

2.43 APHA is responsible for designing and delivering a comprehensive range of business focused training for veterinary, administrative, technical and scientific areas. They assess training needs and work to develop an annual programme of professional training. This approach supports the development of bespoke solutions to meet business needs.

#### **APHA field veterinary staff**

2.44 All new field veterinary entrants receive general and specific training related to their work areas on exotic notifiable diseases procedures. Veterinary staff also have access to a database of disease profiles, covering disease briefing, decision support, ranking and risk assessment (D2R2). Selected individuals attend specific relevant continuing professional development training, for example in epidemiology. APHA hold courses, as required, to ensure an adequate resource of trained staff.

#### **APHA technical staff**

2.45 All new technical staff receive training in animal disease awareness, which covers the specific roles they may perform in a disease outbreak. There is a programme of practical and classroom based training for technical staff identified to

take on the role of case officer, including training for those involved in poultry depopulation.

### **APHA Staff involved in finance or procurement**

2.46 Finance staff are trained to use all appropriate systems to support the financial management of an outbreak from the initial financial decisions and all the subsequent financial information.

2.47 They are trained to set up the appropriate files to capture financial information to support any claim to both the European Commission (EC) and HM Treasury and provide timely financial management information to senior management.

### **APHA administrative staff**

2.48 Administrative staff are involved in a programme of training designed to equip them with the skills and knowledge to provide administrative support during an outbreak and to support the requirements for Finance and Management Information.

### **APHA key administrative, field & technical staff**

2.49 Centres involved in disease control require staff to be able to take up key positions immediately upon confirmation of disease. Key posts have been identified together with responsibilities and working instructions.

2.50 Key administrative, field and technical personnel take part in contingency exercises, which is part of their job description and work objectives.

### **Local Exercises**

2.51 APHA has a programme of coordinated animal disease exercises in order to refine plans and demonstrate their emergency preparedness to deal effectively with an exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak. Each field team takes part in at least one full-scale exercise per year (unless there has been an outbreak), which will include operational partners and stakeholders. The programme identifies the disease(s) to be exercised to ensure all capability can be assessed. The actual locations of exercises within Wales remain a decision for the HoFD in consultation with the Welsh Government, local operational partners and stakeholders.

2.52 Exercises are assessed and evaluation reports are produced, which are used to highlight and promote best practice, lessons identified and to review and update contingency plans as appropriate.

2.53 APHA is also involved in supporting wider exercising of animal disease response plans with partner agencies at the LRF and on an individual organisation basis.

### **GB / UK Exercises**



2.54 The EU FMD Directive 2003/85 requires Member States to exercise their FMD contingency plans twice within a five-year period, although there is a derogation allowing one of these real-time exercises to be for another “major epidemic disease affecting terrestrial animals”.

2.55 Exercise Blackthorn (2018) covered Foot and Mouth Disease, it was the UK’s last live play exercise and involved the Welsh Government, Defra, the SG, t DAERA, APHA, operational partners and stakeholder organisations. In addition, UK table top exercises rehearsed the UK’s plans for African Horse Sickness (AHS) in July 2015 (Exercise Tulpar), FMD in November 2015 (Exercise Rowan) and again in December 2016 (Exercise Willow).

## **Assurance**

### **Emergency Readiness Management Assurance Scheme (ERMAS)**

2.56 The ERMAS is a framework tool used to enable APHA to monitor and confirm the extent to which the Agency can effectively mount an initial response to disease outbreaks. There are two components:

- ERMAS1 - measures the readiness of APHA’s field services to operate in response to an animal disease emergency, ERMAS also seeks to assure that plans and procedures are in place to allow the business transition into an effective disease response mode, utilising the structures described in this plan.;
- ERMAS2 - measures the readiness of APHA’s customer service centres to provide outbreak surveillance, licensing and tracings functions that support the actions of field services.

2.57 Assessments occur annually and the framework tool is regularly updated to account for changes to business processes or delivery models.

2.57 APHA also administers the Disease Response Capability Assessment (DRCA) on behalf of Defra. DRCA seeks parts of APHA, e.g. Laboratory Services and IT services and Operational Partners with a defined statutory outbreak response to determine their confidence in their capacity and capability to respond to varying outbreak scenarios.

## 3. Response


### Alert System to Indicate Disease Status

3.1 Table 1 below sets out the standard alert system to describe the current status of a specific disease outbreak or incident of exotic notifiable animal disease.

**Table 1: Alert status**

<b>White:</b>	This indicates that the disease is not present or suspected in the UK and will be the state of alert under normal circumstances.
<b>Black:</b>	This indicates that the risk of disease is higher than normal. For example disease may be suspected or confirmed in a nearby EU Member State. This would warrant a higher level of vigilance. The decision to raise the state of alert from white to black will be taken by the Chief Veterinary Officer UK (CVO UK).
<b>Amber:</b>	<p>This indicates that there is a strong suspicion of the presence of the disease on a particular premises based on the clinical picture, following a veterinary inquiry. Samples will have been submitted for laboratory analysis.</p> <p>Government Laboratories may identify a notifiable disease as part of routine surveillance, in which case there could be an immediate move to the amber alert stage.</p>
<b>Red:</b>	This indicates that disease has been confirmed or that an operational response has been initiated.

Figure 1: Actions performed between white and red status



3.2 Paragraphs 2.4 to 2.6 above explain the responsibilities of anyone keeping an animal. There is a legal duty on anyone who suspects that an animal may have a notifiable disease to report their suspicions to the Welsh Ministers via APHA using the **APHA Wales customer contact number, 0300 303 8268**, out of hours cover arrangements are in place. If, on consideration of the report notifiable disease cannot be ruled out a Veterinary Inspector (VI) will carry out an investigation.

3.3 The VI will inform the APHA Veterinary Exotic Notifiable Diseases Unit (VENDU) of suspicion of disease and that an investigation is underway. In Wales, APHA will also notify the Head of Animal Disease Policy.

3.4 The premises where disease is suspected is immediately placed under restrictions preventing any movement on or off. The VI will examine the animals suspected of being affected at the premises and, in conjunction with VENDU, will decide on further action. This could mean notifiable disease can be ruled out and restrictions removed or if not, samples may be taken for laboratory testing or disease may be confirmed on clinical grounds. The premises remain under restrictions and monitoring continues until disease is either ruled out or confirmed.

3.5 Disease is only likely to be confirmed on clinical grounds when there is an ongoing outbreak in GB and there is a known epidemiological link to confirmed disease.

3.6 Notification of disease within government takes a standard format. Initial notification is the responsibility of VENDU and is circulated across government and key responder agencies. A text message will also be sent to key officials:

- Chief Veterinary Officer (UK);
- Chief Veterinary Officer (Wales);
- Chief Veterinary Officer (Scotland);
- Chief Veterinary Officer (Northern Ireland);
- Senior government officials in Wales, England, Scotland and Northern Ireland;
- Other UK government departments;
- APHA senior management; and
- Others within government with a role in the response.

3.7 When suspicion of disease arises officials will decide if there is sufficient concern to alert GB Core Groups and to keep them informed of developments.

### **CVO Case Conference**

3.8 On suspicion of disease there may be a series of case conferences to discuss emerging issues. The four CVOs from the UK, key policy and veterinary officials from each administration would normally attend. The meeting will consider whether circumstances warrant triggering an Amber Teleconference. The CVO (UK)'s office will organise the case conference and will provide the secretariat. If a conference is required outside normal office hours and at weekends the secretariat function is carried out by the Defra Exotic Disease Policy Response team (EDPRT).

### **Amber Teleconference**

3.9 If suspicion of disease is strong and its presence cannot be ruled out on clinical grounds an Amber teleconference is held. Its purpose is to apprise the attendees of the situation, to assess the risk and to agree next steps.

3.10 The Amber telephone conference is organised by Defra's EDPRT and is chaired by the CVO for the territory where disease is suspected and follows a standard agenda. Participants include the four UK CVOs and senior officials from the Welsh Government, Defra, SG, DAERA, APHA, the relevant UK reference laboratory for the disease being investigated, the local APHA managers for the affected area and relevant representatives from other UK government departments and Health Agencies.

3.11 During the teleconference the relevant CVO may negate disease or decide to confirm disease (raising the alert status to Red and invoking the response component of this Plan) or specify what further evidence, such as test results, would

be needed. The teleconference would also agree plans for future actions and communications based on the emerging situation.

3.12 If the veterinary risk assessment of the group at the teleconference indicates an unacceptable risk in waiting for laboratory test results, the relevant CVO may decide to move to Red alert without waiting for the results of laboratory investigations.

### **Disease Confirmation Telecom**

3.13 Confirmation of a first case, in any administration, will be done in a Disease Confirmation Telecom. The CVO of each administration can order the culling on an affected premise without consultation with the other administrations whilst ensuring APHA VENDU are involved.

### **Notifications**

3.14 If following the teleconference, the level of suspicion is considered sufficient to warrant further action but disease is not confirmed at that stage, officials will take responsibility for notifying others, including stakeholder organisations and operational partners at national and local level. If following these initial notifications a full disease control operation is likely to commence, there are additional notifications and actions for officials to undertake. This includes both:

- Placing the NDCC policy and operational functions on alert and potentially establish some elements of the NDCC
- Authorisation and establishment of a Central Disease Control Centre (CDCC) and FOB
- Placing the ECC (W) functions on alert and potentially establish some elements of the ECC (W).

3.15 At the suspicion phase there are several key communications actions aimed at ensuring that appropriate accurate information is distributed and there is a move to a red alert communications resources are available to support operations.

## **4. Organisational Structures for Control & Co-ordination**

4.1 This part of the plan is invoked on confirmation of an exotic notifiable animal disease or where, pending confirmation, the suspicion of disease is strong and a decision has been taken to undertake disease control activities. Clear command and control structures are then put in place to direct, coordinate and support the disease control response.

4.2 OCVO will lead the response for exotic notifiable disease outbreaks in Wales, working with Defra, APHA and other operational partners.

4.3 Three levels of command may be established, **strategic, tactical or operational**. Flexibility and proportionality in the delivery of the response is

important. For a small outbreak it may not be necessary to establish all the structures required for a major outbreak. Most of the activities and functions will still be needed but there may be variations in the way that they are delivered.

### **Emergency Co-ordination Centre (Wales) (ECC (W))**

4.4 In a notifiable exotic animal disease outbreak in England, Northern Ireland or Scotland, the Welsh Government would consider the appropriate level of involvement in light of the circumstances.

4.5 Consideration will be given to whether to establish the ECC (W) based on the circumstances of the outbreak. If it is not established, key officials would be placed on standby and OCVO officials would participate at a strategic level remotely, by video or telephone conference.

4.6 In the event of an animal disease outbreak in Wales this plan may be invoked and the ECC (W) may be established. The CVO (W) and the Head of Animal Disease Policy Branch (ADPB) will determine whether there is a need to establish the ECC (W).

4.7 In a disease outbreak in Wales, APHA would be responsible for the delivery of the operational response. The Welsh Government will provide strategic policy leadership, support the tactical control, operational management and provide additional resources necessary to deliver disease control measures.

4.8 The ECC (W) is responsible for determining policy and co-ordinating advice on disease control affecting Wales and the management of the wider consequences of an outbreak. The ECC (W) if established would consist of the following Cells:

- Director's Cell: provides the administrative support for the Director (ECC(W)) and includes the CVO Wales, Head of ADPB and OCVO Veterinary Advisers would provide the strategic policy lead;
- Situation Cell: ensures there is an immediate, authoritative overview of the outbreak. The cell ensures the accuracy of situation reports, management reports and statistics that they presented in the manner prescribed and sent on time. The cell maintains close liaison with the FOB;
- Licensing Cell: is responsible for the production of general and individual licenses. In liaison with OCVO Veterinary Advisers to determine what conditions need to be applied;
- Disease Policy Cell: is responsible for disease policy, briefing, production of legislation. Also responsible for co-ordinating activities in support of the Directors Cell. The cell will have an overview of the operational field activities on such matters as culling, disposal, cleansing and disinfection. The cell is also responsible for co-ordinating agreement on draft emergency instructions issued via the NDCC and is the main link with the NDCC;
- Communications Cell: is responsible for the co-ordination of key messages and information relating to the disease outbreak and its wider impact. They maintain liaison with the communications teams in Defra, APHA and, where appropriate the other Devolved Governments. The cell liaises with the Publicity Team on any necessary funded material, internal communications for Welsh Government staff

and Central Web Team for updating the Welsh Government website. The cell also maintains contact with Press Office in Cardiff Bay, where all media enquiries are handled.

4.9 The Welsh Government Resilience Team is responsible for providing the equipment support, assistance with the activation of the ECC (W) and the management of the 'emergency volunteers' pool, if required.

4.10 The ECC (W) will also host liaison officers from operational partners and stakeholders as required, further advice on these can be found in section 10.

4.11 The majority of staff deployed to the ECC (W) will be provided by OCVO and the Land, Nature and Food and Marine Directorate, although staff from across Economy, Skills and Natural Resources (ESNR) and the emergency volunteer pool may also be deployed.

4.12 Staff from the following teams may be called upon to provide assistance:

- Strategic Communications
- Rural Affairs Legal Services
- Resilience Team
- Geography and Technology Team

### **National Disease Control Centre (NDCC)**


4.13 The NDCC brings together policy functions provided by the GB administrations with the operations functions provided by APHA and other partners. Figure 2, overleaf, sets out the structure of the NDCC. The main responsibilities are:

- Policy:
  - to develop, determine and interpret policy within the legislative and wider strategic framework
  - to advise ministers and other strategic decision makers
  - to work in partnership with stakeholders
- Operations:
  - to engage with teams across the NDCC, CDCC, FOB, operational partners and stakeholders to coordinate the outbreak response and provide tactical advice

4.14 A framework for decision making during outbreaks has been established which is clear, transparent, timely, auditable and adheres to the principle of subsidiarity (the organising principle that matters ought to be handled by the smallest, lowest or least centralised authority).



**Figure 2 – Command structures**



## **Central Disease Control Centre (CDCC)**

### **Outbreak Director**

4.15 At the tactical level, APHA establishes a CDCC headed by the APHA Outbreak Director. The CDCC is a virtual structure and will be located across multiple sites and include functions delivered across the agency. The CDCC coordinates operational activities taking place at the Forward Operations Base (FOB) and the Customer Service Centres (CSCs).

### **Forward Operations Base (FOB)**

4.16 The FOB implements the disease control operation, ensuring that local operational partners and stakeholders are appropriately engaged. The FOB follows tactical direction and policy guidance set out in the relevant disease control strategies, contingency plans and operational instructions. The FOB also reports progress of the disease control operation to the Outbreak Coordination Group within the CDCC.

4.17 A FOB will be established close to the outbreak or incident location, providing an operational base for those teams that are predominantly involved in field based activities e.g. patrolling, surveillance and field operations. Dependant on the nature of an outbreak, further FOBs may be established.

4.18 When disease is confirmed, the HoFD (or delegated representative) will brief the Welsh Government's LGPS resilience team and the chair of the Local Resilience Forum (LRF) in some areas this may be via the LA Animal Health function) on the situation and agree local arrangements as a wider consequence of the outbreak. If necessary, a local Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) may be established to manage the wider impacts of an outbreak on the local area (e.g. health, social, economic, environmental and public information) and the Chair of the SCG and HoFD will work closely together.

### **Confirmation**

4.19 Once disease has been confirmed, further positive cases are confirmed through CVO Disease Confirmation Teleconferences or, in an extensive and ongoing outbreak, further delegated to the NDCC. Further amber teleconferences may be held where disease is suspected in a new territory.

4.20 Following the Amber teleconference, a record of the meeting will be circulated by the Defra EDPRT to key operational partners. APHA will consider whether to invoke their response plans (e.g. for the provision of IT and financial systems). If appropriate, APHA will also consider the establishment of some or all elements of the NDCC.

4.21 Locally, APHA will notify the affected animal keeper, local operational partners (e.g. LAs, police force(s), Natural Resources Wales (NRW), Public Health Wales (PHW) etc.) and local stakeholders including the local branches of the National

Farmers Union Wales and the Farming Union of Wales and veterinary practices. Nationally, Defra will inform stakeholder organisations.

4.22 At Red alert, the Head of Outbreak Coordination Group (OCG) will notify other operational partners as required.

4.23 Locally, APHA will additionally make arrangement to notify animal keepers, other occupiers of business and premises, utility companies, local operational partners and stakeholders within affected zone(s) and a text alert will be sent to keepers who have subscribed to the service.

### **European Commission and OIE**

4.24 The CVO (UK) has responsibility for notifying the European Commission, other EU Member States and the OIE of an outbreak of exotic notifiable disease within any part of the UK.

## **5. Disease Outbreak Roles and Responsibilities**

5.1 Section 4 introduced three levels of command (Strategic, Tactical and Operational) that may be established during a disease outbreak (or where suspicion is strong and confirmation is pending) and the process leading up to confirmation of disease. This section explains the command structure in more detail.

### **Strategic Level - GB**

#### **Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR)**

5.2 The UK maintains the capability to respond to the range of hazards and threats facing the country through the activation of central response arrangements within the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR). The COBR mechanism facilitates cross-government decision making and ensures ministers and senior officials are provided with timely, coordinated and quality advice to enable quick and efficient decision making during times of national crisis.

5.3 COBR arrangements bring together Defra (the lead UK government department), Devolved Governments (as appropriate), other UK government departments, international partners and other response organisations, where appropriate, to maintain a common understanding of the latest situation and provide advice on strategic issues to Ministers. It consists of a ministerial decision group (National Security Council (Threats, Hazards, Resilience and Contingencies) (NSC(THRC))) and a number of supporting elements which ensure they have access to coordinated, timely, well-balanced advice. COBR is designed to be a flexible mechanism that can be adapted to the circumstances. The support cells include a situation cell that coordinates the production and maintenance of a Commonly Recognised Information Picture (CRIP). Other possible support cells include policy and news coordination cells and a Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies

(SAGE). SAGE will coordinate scientific and technical advice to inform cross-Government decision making.

5.4 The decision to activate COBR in response to an exotic notifiable disease outbreak in animals will be taken by the Cabinet Office Secretariat (CCS), in conjunction with Defra and No. 10. Once activated, CCS is responsible for running the COBR mechanism to co-ordinate the cross-government response to the outbreak in support of the lead government department. The decision to activate SAGE will be taken by Defra, Departmental Chief Scientific Advisers (CSAs) and CVOs in consultation with CCS and the Government's CSA.

5.5 COBR meetings may be chaired by ministers or officials depending on the nature and stage of the outbreak.

## **Strategic Level - Wales**

### **Cabinet Secretary for Energy, Planning and Rural Affairs**

5.6 The Cabinet Secretary's involvement will be dependent on the circumstances and scale of the outbreak, although in all cases regular contact with OCVO will be maintained. Ministerial involvement is likely to be greater in a widespread outbreak affecting Wales or a zoonotic disease affecting human health. The Cabinet Secretary may be required to:

- Decide on the use of emergency vaccination as a disease control measure, based upon epidemiological and scientific evidence provided by CVO (W) following recommendation from the Animal Disease Policy Group (ADPG).
- Provide updates to the First Minister and Cabinet.
- Provide updates to the National Assembly for Wales (Plenary) on the current risks and disease control measures.
- Provide updates to relevant National Assembly for Wales Committee(s).
- Liaise closely with the other Welsh Ministers to consider the wider implications of the outbreak.
- Brief the media and / or nominate the CVO (W) to be the spokesperson.
- Attend meetings of the NSC (THRC), usually by video or telephone conference, to consider strategic issues and the wider implications; in particular strategies for relief and recovery
- Consider and develop strategies and operational policies where wider government commitment is required.
- Consider representations from Stakeholders;
- Respond to Assembly Questions.

### **Welsh Government Officials**

5.7 Officials work in close collaboration to ensure; an effective response to the outbreak, the management of associated risks, consistency with our strategic objective for eradicating the disease and regaining disease free status.

5.8 The main responsibilities of the senior Welsh Government officials involved in the outbreak response is provided below.

## **Permanent Secretary**

5.9 The Permanent Secretary is ultimately responsible for all strategic decisions taken within the Welsh Government and horizon scanning for wider Government issues. There are no specific actions for the Permanent Secretary in the event of an outbreak.

## **Chief Veterinary Officer (Wales) (CVO (W))**

5.10 The CVO (W) is responsible for:

- Confirming the presence of a notifiable exotic animal disease in Wales and leading a coordinated response to an outbreak. Working closely with senior officials in the Welsh Government, other administrations and APHA, taking account of risks, evidence and issues such as the impact on the farming industry and the public and the delivery of disease control.
- Animal health and welfare policy in Wales.
- Providing challenge to veterinary (and scientific) advice given to inform outbreak decision making and is ultimately responsible for veterinary and policy advice to Ministers and senior officials.
- Briefing the media on the disease situation and, if nominated by the Cabinet Secretary, acting as the Welsh Government's spokesperson.
- Strategic planning and the setting of objectives for disease control.
- The Deputy Chief Veterinary Officer will provide cover for the above roles and responsibilities .

## **Veterinary Lead Wales (VLW) (APHA) – embedded in ECC(W)**

5.11 A VLW from APHA is embedded in the ECC(W) and is responsible for:-

- Undertaking horizon scanning for tactical risk and issues.
- Vet to vet conversations on field delivery, liaising with the veterinary and technical advice team.

## **Senior Policy Advisor**

5.12 The Senior Policy Advisor is responsible for:

- Liaising with communications, CVO, Cabinet Secretary, other Governments, ECC(W) and policy teams to provide information back and forth.
- Communicating with FOBs.
- Communicating with internal and external stakeholder and operational partners.

## **Head of Animal Disease Policy Branch (ADPB)**

5.13 The Head of ADPB is responsible for:

- Disease control policy.
- Ensuring that contingency arrangements are invoked, as appropriate.
- Participation in strategic and tactical level meetings on behalf of the Welsh Government.
- Horizon scanning for strategic, tactical and operational issues.

## **Chair Welsh Government Civil Contingencies Group (CCG)**

5.14 Normally the CCG would be chaired by the Director for Local Government. However, in an outbreak of a notifiable exotic animal disease, the chair of this group may be the Director Land, Nature and Food. The Chair of the Welsh Government CCG is: -

- The principal adviser to the Welsh Government Permanent Secretary and the Welsh Ministers, particularly in respect of the wider impact and consequence management of an animal disease outbreak in Wales, ensuring that they are appropriately engaged.
- Responsible for strategic planning and setting objectives in respect of wider issues, consequence management and recovery.
- Responsible for considering the staffing required and the possible redeployment of human resources.

## **Director Agriculture, Food & Marine (AF&M)**

5.15 The Director Land, Nature and Food is responsible for: -

- Ensuring that there is appropriate and proportionate engagement with the disease control operation
- Addressing the wider impact on agriculture, the food supply and the rural community
- Ensuring that there is appropriate Ministerial engagement.
- Liaising with the Deputy Director for Agriculture, Sustainable Development, in their capacity as Director (ECC(W)).
- Taking appropriate steps to prepare for the post-disease recovery phase, considering actions needed for the short, medium and longer terms.

## **Head of Strategic Communication**

5.16 The Head of Strategic Communications (HSC) is responsible for: -

- Ensuring that the Welsh Government has a robust and proportionate communications strategy in place to meet the demands of a disease outbreak situation.
- Advising the Welsh Ministers, the Chair of the CCG and the CVO (W) on communications issues and strategy.
- Horizon scanning for strategic and tactical communications issues.
- Establish appropriate media briefing, public information and digital communications at both a Wales and local level, and arrange briefing on an ongoing basis, as considered necessary.
- Liaise with Defra and APHA Communication teams on central messages.

### **Director (ECC(W))**

5.17 The Deputy Director of Agriculture, Sustainable Development Division would be notified to take up post as Situation Director on confirmation of an outbreak of an animal disease covered by this plan and would lead the ECC (W). The Situation Director will work in close collaboration with the CVO (W) and be responsible for: -

- Acting as the chief of staff to the Chair of the CCG.
- Providing strategic leadership and direction for the ECC (W) and taking an overview of the disease control operation and management of its consequences
- Liaising with the HoFD and WG Policy Adviser(s) to ensure awareness of local operational activities.
- Liaising with the SCG Chairs, where established.
- Providing a daily situation report (SITREP) from the ECC (W) to the NDCC.

### **APHA Chief Executive**

5.17 The APHA CEO is responsible for: -

- Leading the delivery of operational response and briefing senior officials and Ministers, if required, on disease control operations.
- Planning the effective delivery of strategic and tactical decisions.
- Ensuring the appropriate management of all operational disease control staff and authorising recruitment of additional staff.
- Providing the Welsh Ministers with information concerning control and recovery operations.



## **6. Tactical Level**

### **Tactical Level - GB**

6.1 The GB tactical response is co-ordinated by the NDCC, referred to earlier in section 4, and will be appropriate to the level required to handle the outbreak or incident. The NDCC is based in London and brings together policy and operational functions (APHA), other operational partners and key stakeholders. The NDCC coordinates the tactical response as described below.

### **NDCC Policy Functions**

6.2 The Welsh Government ECC (W) works in close liaison with the NDCC and is responsible for policy advice in respect of Wales. The Defra Deputy Director Animal Health Policy and Implementation leads in providing exotic disease policy advice to the NDCC in consultation with the policy teams in the devolved administrations.

### **Exotic Disease Policy Response Team (EDPRT)**

6.3 The EDPRT in Defra, supports the exotic disease policy leads and strategic policy officials in delivering all of their functions. EDPRT triggers and manages the Amber teleconference arrangements.

6.4 EDPRT also sets up and manages a disease free status programme that provides historical timelines and articulates exit strategies. They work closely with their communications team and the Welsh Government communications team to ensure that correct and timely information is provided.

6.5 The EDPRT, in conjunction with other policy areas, monitors the policy staff resources required and can if necessary call upon additional personnel with the relevant policy and support skills to ensure the effective running of the NDCC in the event of a disease outbreak.

### **Export Policy and Official Feed and Food Controls (OFFC)**

6.6 Export Policy and Official Feed and Food Controls (OFFC) are responsible for policies to prevent the transmission of disease to other countries by controlling the export of commodities that are capable of spreading disease. This includes re-establishing export markets as the disease situation improves.

### **Imports and intra-community trade**

6.7 The imports and intra-community trade team monitors animal diseases across the world (particularly those affecting trading partners and countries bordering the EU), that would have a significant impact if introduced into the UK. They produce preliminary outbreak assessments or full qualitative risk assessments to assist decision-making by those responsible for biosecurity, surveillance, disease preparedness and enforcement.

## **International Relations**

6.8 The International relations team are responsible for communications within the EU and internationally, ensuring effective representation of the UK's disease control activities.

## **Animal Welfare**

6.9 Defra's Animal Welfare Team is responsible for providing policy advice on animal welfare on farm during depopulation and transportation, as well as on the position of companion animals. During a disease outbreak the team will be responsible for providing any necessary advice, including the need to protect the welfare of animals affected by movement restrictions. The team will also seek ministerial approval of killing methods used for disease control purposes where this is required by the legislation. When appropriate they will work with the Sector Engagement Team on farm, during depopulation (and wider slaughter situations) and during transportation.

## **Sustainable and Competitive Farming Strategy (Sector Engagement)**

6.10 The Sector Engagement Team will advise on the impact on the food supply markets of disease control policies (e.g. depopulation, movement restriction, stamping of meat from restricted areas, impact of vaccination on exports etc.). The team will also engage with the European Commission (DG Agri) on any market intervention measures, advise on state aid aspects of any compensation levels for culled livestock, work with Animal Welfare Policy Team on animal welfare matters and advise on disposal of animal by-products.

## **Food Chain Directorate**

6.11 The Defra Food Chain Directorate will, in the event of a major outbreak, convene the Food Chain Emergency Liaison Group (FCELG) which has representation from the main sectors in the foods supply chain and from across Government, including the Devolved Governments. This group will assess any potential implications from the outbreak on the resilience of the food supply chain and report back to the EDPRT for input to the daily strategic stocktakes and briefing to COBR if appropriate. FCELG will also coordinate any requests for information from government relating to the impact on food supply, such as questions relating to vaccination. The FPU would also convene the FCELG during major exercises to cover these types of questions.

## **Rural Division (Defra)**

6.12 Rural Division will assess the impact of an outbreak on the wider rural economy by liaising with key stakeholders using local intelligence from Rural Development Programme for England (RDPE).

## **Rural Development Programme for England (RDPE)**

6.13 In the lead up to and during the recovery phase, the RDPE, through the Rural Payment Agency, will liaise with local economic partnerships and other networks to advise if interventions that are able to be funded by the RDPE are required.

## **Communications Group**

6.14 Defra's Communications Group is responsible for ensuring that the department has a robust and proportionate communications strategy in place in order to meet the demands of a disease outbreak situation. They will ensure that Defra internal communication channels, the UK Government's public website ([GOV.UK](https://www.gov.uk)) and the Defra Helpline are updated appropriately and manage communications with the media as appropriate. They will also advise their ministers, other UK ministers, CVO UK and Defra CSA on communications issues, engage with Defra Communications Network establish a communications team as part of the NDCC and with the communications teams in the Devolved Governments. They will also work with APHA Communications and HoFD to set up a local presence in the FOBs.

## **Finance Business Partner for Animal Health and Welfare (Disease Control)**

6.15 The Finance Business Partner will support the finance director for APHA, liaise with the Defra Director of Finance and maintain a flow of communications appropriate to the scale and seriousness of an outbreak. They will also liaise with HM Treasury and other stakeholders as required.

## **Defra legal advisers**

6.16 Defra's Animal Health and Welfare team's legal advisers are responsible for ensuring that the disease control operation complies with domestic and international legal obligations and will liaise with policy colleagues to ensure that disease control policies support this. They provide advice to the NDCC and ADPG.

## **Reference laboratories**

6.17 National Reference Laboratories are responsible for the provision and interpretation of diagnostic and surveillance testing as well as disease-specific expert knowledge in relation to the application of laboratory tests, epidemiology and control measures. The reference laboratories for exotic notifiable animal diseases in the UK are the Pirbright Institute, Porton Down (Anthrax only) and the APHA Weybridge.

## **Operational Partners**

6.18 The management, control and eradication of a notifiable animal disease outbreak requires a coordinated response from numerous organisations. Depending on the disease in question and the scale and severity of the outbreak, the FOB may include representation from operational partners including those described at the tactical level.

## **Individual Police Forces**

6.19 In addition to their wider role in relation to maintaining order and protecting the public, individual police forces will fulfil a number of specific roles in relation to an animal disease outbreak including the policing of control zones, enforcement of movement controls with local authorities, providing general co-ordination of emergencies support, particularly in pursuing legal entry to premises, providing specialist knowledge in the area of management and co-ordination of major incidents and work in partnership with local authorities and APHA to share and consider local intelligence. A chief officer from the force area affected is usually the chair of the SCG and may be the chair if an outbreak or the activities needed to deal with it, reach such proportions that a critical or major incident is declared and the SCG established. Outside of disease outbreaks, response issues are considered as part of the National Police Chief's Council (NPCC) animal disease lead.

## **Individual Local Authorities**

6.20 Local authorities are major operational partners in the response to a notifiable exotic animal disease outbreak. They are responsible for the enforcement of disease control measures, play a key role in implementation of disease control strategies, and are fundamental to rapid and efficient access to local information and resources. They also fulfil a significant role in providing advice and education at a local level. Animal health legislation enforcement functions are usually provided by the trading standards or environmental health services. During an outbreak, local authorities provide resources such as staff (including Animal Health Officers, Emergency Planning Officers and Highways and Public Rights of Way departments), vehicles, equipment and buildings and where necessary, enforce disease control measures and movement licence conditions and erect road signs for publicising control zones. LAs also provide liaison officer representation at the operational command level.

## **National Disease Control Centre (NDCC) Operations Functions**

### **APHA Outbreak Director**

6.21 The APHA Outbreak Director is sourced from within APHA and is responsible for managing the overall operational response, provision of veterinary advice to field staff (via the Head of Veterinary & Technical Operations) and both epidemiology advice (including epidemiological modelling), via National Emergency Epidemiology Group (NEEG) and field veterinary advice, to the National Experts Group (NEG) and ADPG. They will also deputise for the Chief Executive, APHA, when necessary and liaise with VENDU or the Disease Reporting Team.

## **Finance Director for APHA**

6.22 The Finance Director for APHA is responsible for ensuring the financial integrity of the disease control operation. Upon confirmation of disease, working alongside the Welsh Government, they will ensure all necessary finance structures are in place in the NDCC, FOB(s) and sites associated with the outbreak, oversee and provide support to the NDCC Finance and the Defra Procurement team, horizon scan for strategic and tactical issues, prepare papers for the Emergency Executive Committee (ExCo), and advise on options and recommendations.

6.23 The NDCC Finance Team is responsible for ensuring that the full cost of the disease control operation is accurately monitored and captured. The team provides financial reports as required and supporting evidence if forecasts indicate that a claim for reserve funding is required from HM Treasury. They are also responsible for payment to suppliers and contractors, compensation to affected parties, HM Treasury reporting, financial reporting and EU co-financing claims.

## **Human Resources (HR)**

6.24 The HR team manages and coordinates the provision of veterinary, technical, specialist, and administrative resources. It works with other parts of the Defra Network and, depending on the size of the outbreak, with CCS, Department for Work and Pensions (Jobcentre Plus), operational support secretariat, OGDs and industry organisations to secure emergency staff, including veterinary resource. The team may liaise with the RCVS, British Veterinary Association (BVA), Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Chief Veterinary Officers (CVOs) of other countries over recruitment of veterinary or other staff and the use of the International Animal Health Emergency Reserve (IAHER). The HR team is also responsible for establishing contract terms and conditions for additional staff and contracted personnel and liaising where appropriate with Defra group commercial.

## **Veterinary Exotic Notifiable Diseases Unit (VENDU)**

6.25 VENDU is part of the APHA Advice Services Team, responsible for veterinary advice to policy makers on the control of the disease. VENDU receives reports of suspected disease from the field, ensures that disease investigations are undertaken effectively, that notifications are distributed and acted upon, co-ordinates sample test results from the laboratory, considers the options for control, makes recommendations as appropriate and acts as a central co-ordination point to collate, refine and present up-to-date information on disease reports.

6.26 If appropriate during an outbreak/incident, VENDU may delegate some or all of their responsibilities relating to that outbreak/incident to an NDCC Disease Reporting Team (DRT). VENDU will retain functional management of the DRT and continue to handle report cases for other notifiable exotic animal diseases.

## **Disease Reporting Team (DRT)**

6.27 The decision to establish a DRT will be made by the Veterinary Head of Exotics and Welfare in consultation with the Outbreak Director and the Head of OCG. The Veterinary Head of Exotics and Welfare will be responsible for the staffing of the DRT and designated APHA vets from a pool will be called in to resource the team at an agreed time.

## **Head of Outbreak Coordination Group (OCG)**

6.28 The Head of OCG is responsible for the battle rhythm and co-ordination of APHA NDCC and CDCC functions. They will notify interested parties about the disease investigation during suspicion and upon confirmation of disease, will consider the establishment of proportional elements of the CDCC and ensure that contingency arrangements are enacted.

6.29 The Head of OCG ensures efficient coordination occurs across Defra, operational partners and stakeholders and agrees any deviation from the established operational structures and ways of working with the CVO UK.

## **OCG Forward Planning**

6.30 Forward planning are responsible for horizon scanning to identify possible operational and logistic problems and provide solutions. They will use the output of epidemiological modelling for resource planning purposes in order to assess the operational impact of the predicted progression of the outbreak, identifying likely strategic, tactical and operational milestones

## **OCG Management Information and Reporting Team**

6.31 The OCG Management Information and Reporting Team is responsible for collecting, collating and interpreting summary data and information on the control and management of the outbreak. The team will be a central point of intelligence on the outbreak, its impact and control. They will receive the collated daily situation reports from the CDCC(s). They will compile the OCG report of data and analysis, which will be submitted to CCS on a daily basis or less frequently as jointly agreed between CCS and the Head of the OCG. The OCG Management Information and Reporting Team will also coordinate the Defra/APHA contributions to the Commonly Recognised Information Picture (CRIP).

## **OCG Field Operations Team**

6.32 The Field Operations Team support the FOBs, coordinating and providing tactical guidance on all aspects of field operations including valuations, depopulation, transport, disposal and C&D operations. They ensure that services are available to carry out key operational functions, maintain an overview of status of the field response, handle disputed valuations, litigations and legal liaison, manage air exclusion zones if required and liaise with central teams of other organisations whose local staff will be involved in the field operation such as the NRW and PHW.

6.33 Field operations also implement vaccination operations if required through management of external emergency vaccination suppliers.

### **Legal Advisers Team**

6.34 Animal Health, Welfare and Food Legal Team advisers provide advice and expertise to the NDCC and ADPG. They have access to a number of additional rota volunteers from other legal teams if needed. Defra legal advisers make provision for this in their business continuity plans.

### **Defra Group Commercial – central outbreak team**

6.35 The central outbreak team provides support and advice on the procurement of goods and services required during disease control operations including utilising framework agreements, call-off procedures, contractual terms and conditions, use of emergency purchase orders and procurement of new goods and services if frameworks are exhausted or new requirements arise.

### **Information Technology Liaison Team**

6.36 The IT Liaison Team co-ordinate requests for IT services and developments and manage their delivery.

### **National Emergency Epidemiology Group (NEEG)**

6.37 The NEEG Executive is responsible for setting up the NEEG so it can provide the CVO UK (and CVO (W) for outbreaks in Wales) and policy makers with expert epidemiological opinion relevant to the control policy and contribute to the relevant National Expert Group on epidemiological matters.

6.38 During an outbreak, the NEEG provides epidemiological advice and assessment on the determinants, level and distribution of disease to the National Experts Group, other groups and the CVOs to inform decisions on disease control and prevention measures including vaccination and surveillance. It leads the epidemiological investigations of exotic disease outbreaks, delivers epidemiological modelling, designs surveillance plans and analyses surveillance outcomes, contributes epidemiological information and expertise to veterinary risk assessments and provides epidemiology reports or the epidemiological components of reports to the UK Governments, the public website, European Commission and OIE. It also provides advice to field operations on disease transmission risks (and potential measures to mitigate these) and likely disease distribution to aid resource allocation and prioritisation of the implementation of control measures.

6.39 The NEEG has a central group ('NEEG in NDCC') responsible for co-ordinating, analysing and reporting epidemiological investigations, ensuring availability of data for modelling and procurement and co-ordination of epidemiological modelling as required. The Head of NEEG will be based in the ECC (W) and NEEG will (via the APHA Head of Field Epidemiology and the APHA Field Epidemiology Lead) also establish a Field Epidemiology Team presence in each



CDCC, the Tracings Team and FOBs as appropriate. The field epidemiologists (field disease investigators) are functionally managed by the NEEG.

### **Veterinary & Technical Advice Team**

6.40 The Veterinary & Technical Advice team co-ordinate and manage the veterinary and technical aspects of the control, eradication and recovery operation. They liaise with the VLW at the ECC(W) and policy colleagues and provide veterinary and technical direction to the field operation by means of instructions and guidance. They also provide veterinary and technical support to the NDCC including the management of sample results other than those from disease investigations and circulation of these to the NEEG.

### **Information Management and Technology Team (IMT)**

6.41 APHA IMT Team will provide an analytical information support service to the Strategic, Tactical and Operational response. In the event of an outbreak of a notifiable exotic animal disease, IMT will form the NDCC Data Analysis and Mapping and Information Technology teams, which includes the provision of data, mapping and management of information. They will be responsible for demographic information on the distribution and numbers of livestock accessed via the Rapid Analysis and Detection of Animal Related Risks (RADAR) data warehouse. This includes the provision of maps and statistics to support risk assessments, disease control operations and requirements to the EU, provision of population information to modellers, and drawing up official zones and production of maps in relation to imposing restrictions. The Animal Demography and Disease Informatics provide advice on specific issues including scientific, technical and disease control measures in disease incident/outbreak situations.

### **Operational Partners (OP)**

6.42 The management, control and eradication of an outbreak of exotic notifiable disease of animals require a coordinated response between numerous organisations. Depending on the disease in question and the scale and severity of the outbreak, the NDCC may include representation from operational partners and stakeholders. Please refer to section 10 for further information on working with operational partners and stakeholders.

6.43 Welsh Government officials may be based in the OCC during large-scale outbreaks in GB. For smaller outbreaks or those where disease is limited to England, Scotland or Northern Ireland it may not be necessary for officials to be embedded within the OCC, but they would participate at NDCC bird-tables via teleconference.

## **Tactical Level - Wales**

### **Deputy Head of Animal Diseases Policy Branch**

6.44 The Deputy Head of ADPB is responsible for: -

- Supporting the development of disease control policy and participation in strategic and tactical level meetings.
- Contingency planning for notifiable exotic animal disease.
- Ensuring that contingency arrangements are invoked, as appropriate.
- Establishing and general management of the ECC (W), as necessary;
- Horizon scanning for strategic, tactical and operational issues.

## **Legal Services - Rural Affairs**

6.45 The Legal Services - Rural Affairs (LSRA) team is responsible for: -

- Ensuring that the disease control operation in Wales complies with both domestic and European legal obligations and responsibilities, liaising with policy colleagues to ensure that our disease control policies support this.
- Ensuring that there is sufficient legal resource available to meet current and emerging needs;
- Ensuring that, on the basis of instructions from OCVO, there is appropriate legal representation at high level meetings and identify and advise on legal issues that may arise as a result of those discussions.

## **7. CDCC Roles and Responsibilities**

The key roles in the disease control operations are described below.

7.1 The CDCC is established by APHA and is headed by the Outbreak Director. The CDCC coordinates and implements the disease control operation, ensuring that local operational partners and stakeholders are appropriately engaged. The CDCC follows tactical direction and policy guidance set out in the relevant disease control strategy, contingency plans and operational instructions. The CDCC will also report back to the OCG, copying to the ECC (W), on the progress of disease control.

7.2 For logistical reasons one or more Forward Operations Bases (FOBs) may be established near the outbreak or incident, providing a local operational base for those CDCC teams involved in patrolling, surveillance and field operations.

7.3 Upon confirmation of disease, the HoFD will brief the Chair of the LRF on the situation and agree the local arrangements necessary to consider any wider consequences of the outbreak. The LRF Chair may convene a local Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) to manage the wider impacts of an outbreak on the local area (e.g. health, social, economic, environmental and public information) and the Chair of the SCG and HoFD will work closely together.

### **Head of Field Delivery Wales (HoFD)**

7.4 The HoFD will lead the disease control operation in Wales and have overall control of any CDCCs and associated FOBs. They will liaise with the Welsh Government Policy Adviser and ensure that arrangements are in place to manage

the wider consequences of the outbreak and manage the relationship with resilience partners.

### **Wales Admin Operations Manager (WAOM)**

7.5 The WAOM is responsible for managing the administrative and support functions of the disease control operation within the CDCC. They will ensure sufficient staff have been engaged to deliver administrative tasks, be accountable and responsible for the tactical and operational delivery of financial management, regularly review the accommodation requirements of the CDCC/FOB and provide support to the HoFD

### **Welsh Government Policy Adviser**

7.6 The Policy Adviser facilitates communication between the policy teams in the ECC (W) and the FOB/NDCC. They will take up their role as soon as possible following an outbreak being confirmed. A Policy Adviser will usually be provided with administrative support.

7.7 The Policy Adviser will facilitate the provision of policy advice to the HoFD, contribute to leadership and direction within the FOB and will be a member of the management team. They will also ensure that APHA and other delivery partners understand, advocate and assist the delivery of required policy objectives. They will maintain an awareness of the wider impacts and emerging issues and actively collect intelligence, in particular sensitive issues, that may have political significance, and apprise the Welsh Government. The Policy Advisers should ensure that any local press or media enquiries are directed to the Welsh Government Press Office.

### **Communications Team**

7.8 The Communications Team provides a comprehensive, integrated communications service, including all aspects of internal and external communications in liaison with the Welsh Government Press Office and the APHA/Defra Communications Group.

### **CDCC Surveillance**

7.9 Surveillance ensures that field teams undertake clinical inspections, verify details of premises, obtain information on stock numbers and disposition on premises and oversee the required surveillance to enable zone clearance or as required for other teams (e.g. epidemiology). This function is supported by activity at an APHA customer service centre

### **CDCC Tracings and Dangerous Contacts**

7.10 Tracings and Dangerous Contacts (DCs) aims to identify the source of disease and limit its spread, by ensuring that tracings are identified and prioritised promptly and where a veterinary risk assessment indicates an unacceptable risk, recommend stock are depopulated as Dangerous Contacts. This function is supported by activity at an APHA customer service centre.

### **CDCC Licensing**

7.11 Licensing assists the disease control process by considering applications for exemptions from restrictions and, where allowed and appropriate, licensing those exemptions e.g. animal movements, activities or events. This function is supported by activity at an APHA customer service centre.

### **International Trade**

7.12 The APHA International Trade team takes action to limit export activity in line with disease control policies to prevent disease spread and help maintain confidence in markets.

### **Veterinary Lead Wales (VLW)**

7.13 The VLW acts as the senior veterinary field adviser to the HoFD and other staff within the field delivery teams. They are responsible for quality assurance of veterinary activities, ensuring that appropriate standards are applied and decisions are made based on sound veterinary advice, appropriate risk assessment and considering wider aspects of veterinary issues.

7.14 The VLW leads FOB operational partner and stakeholder engagement. They act as the local spokesperson on the operational aspects of the disease control in conjunction with the Welsh Government Communications Team, brief and liaise with the sub-national teams to ensure that arrangements are in place to manage the wider consequences of the outbreak and manage the relationship with the wider resilience partners.

### **Senior Delivery Manager Wales**

7.15 The Senior Delivery Manager Wales is responsible for overseeing and managing the field delivery in one or more FOBs within their geographical area. They will ensure that sufficient staff have been engaged to deliver field tasks, regularly review and oversee FOB planning including accommodation requirements and provide support to the HoFD.

## **8. Operational**

### **Operational - Wales**

#### **FOB Manager – Delivery Team Leader / Technical Team Leader**

8.1 The Delivery Team Leader (DTL) and Technical Team Leader (TTL), liaising with the appropriate APHA corporate functions, will be responsible for managing an individual FOB, local accommodation, facilities and resources, including staff, arranging for the provision of arrival, induction, training and departure processes.

#### **FOB Communications**

8.2 Communications provides a comprehensive, integrated communications service, including all aspects of internal and external communications in liaison with the Welsh Government Communications team and the Defra Communications Group.

## **FOB Allocations**

8.3 Allocations ensure that jobs are prioritised, allocated on time, fully completed and accurately recorded.

## **FOB Job pack creations**

8.4 Job pack creation ensures jobs being allocated have the appropriate documents, forms and mapping.

## **FOB Records Management**

8.5 Records Management develops and manages effective records control system, by managing official records including registered files and any other media which conveys information.

## **FOB Field operations**

8.6 Field Operations has overall responsibility for field operations. The team has office based veterinary support in addition to affected premises veterinary and technical involvement through the veterinary and case officer.

## **FOB Biosecurity**

8.7 Biosecurity provides materials, personnel and information to reduce the risk of spread of disease from infected to uninfected stock. The team will also initiate field audits / assessments

## **FOB Culling**

8.8 Culling co-ordinates activities on premises where animals are to be depopulated for disease control purposes. They will liaise with the CDCC Field Operations Team and the Defra Group Commercial.

## **FOB Disposal**

8.9 Disposals co-ordinates the disposal of carcasses from premises where animals are depopulated for disease control purposes.

## **FOB Cleansing and Disinfection**

8.10 Cleansing and Disinfection (C&D) co-ordinates appropriate activities on premises where animals have been depopulated for disease control purposes. They liaise with CDCC Field Operations and the Defra Group Commercial on the provision of contractors.

8.11 On premises where animals have been depopulated for disease control purposes, C&D assess requirements for preliminary and final C&D and provide advice on how it should be done. C&D will seek veterinary and scientific advice from others as appropriate.

## **FOB Sample Handling**

8.12 Sample Handling advises on sampling requirements and coordinates the packing and dispatch of samples to the laboratory. It may include a liaison officer from APHA Weybridge. It works closely with Surveillance and Epidemiology Teams.

### **FOB Stores**

8.13 Stores maintain sufficient supplies to allow undertaking of patrolling, surveillance and for field operations activities on premises where animals have been depopulated for disease control purposes.

### **FOB Valuation**

8.14 Valuation ensures that fair and accurate valuations of all livestock being depopulated for disease control purposes are carried out in accordance with legislative and policy requirements.

### **Case Officer**

8.15 A Case Officer is appointed for each premises where disease control activity is taking place. They operate from the premises and are the point of contact with the occupier/operator. They are responsible for overseeing all activities including APHA staff, police officers deployed to the site, other officials, valuers, slaughtermen, contractors etc. They ensure a coordinated well directed operation, compliance with health and safety protocols, minimise the risk of disease spread from the premises and achieve rapid and effective completion of disease control measures.

### **Gate Officer**

8.16 A Gate Officer is appointed to each premises on which work is taking place and controls and records movement of people, vehicles, materials and equipment onto and off of any premises on which disease control activity is taking place.

### **FOB Epidemiological Intelligence**

8.17 Epidemiological Intelligence contributes to the understanding and control of disease by gathering, collating and interpreting field epidemiological information, considering patterns of disease, assessing risk factors and disseminating this information. It is made up of members of the APHA Epidemiology team and is a key component of the NEEG.

### **FOB Health and Safety**

8.18 Health and Safety provides advice and assistance for all aspects of staff health and safety, liaising with NDCC HR and PHW as appropriate.

## 9. Groups and Committees

### Strategic Level

#### **National Security Council (Threats, Hazards, Resilience and Contingencies) (NSC (THRC))**

9.1 The NSC (THRC) is a ministerial sub-committee of the National Security Council. It meets to consider issues relating to threats, hazards, resilience and contingencies and includes a restricted group which considers intelligence matters. The NSC (THRC) will report as necessary to the National Security Council.

9.2 When meeting to consider the government's response to civil emergencies the Terms of Reference will be:

- to consider, in civil emergencies, plans for the protection of life, the continuity of everyday activity, and the restoration of disrupted services.

9.3 For outbreaks of animal disease the chair will typically be taken by the Minister of State for farming, food and marine environment, although in large-scale outbreaks, the Prime Minister may chair these meetings. The Cabinet Office CCS will provide the secretariat. Ministers from the appropriate UK governments will be invited to attend. Depending on the circumstances or situation other organisations, such as the NPCC and the Food Standards Agency, may also be included.

9.4 The issues that are likely to be discussed include the operational response, the impacts on the wider government, stakeholder engagement, international and European issues, forward strategy, communications and media, and recovery.

#### **National Security Council (Threats, Hazards, Resilience and Contingencies (Officials) (NSC (THRC) (O))**

9.5 The NSC (THRC) (O) is the level where the senior officials of the appropriate government departments meet. If the civil emergency is sufficient to warrant it, for example in a large-scale disease outbreak, the issues will be passed to the ministerial sub-committee NSC (THRC) to debate. The Group have the same remit as NSC (THRC).

#### **Welsh Government Civil Contingencies Group (CCG)**

9.6 The CCG will review the impact on Wales of the disease outbreak and the effect on wider responsibilities across the Welsh Government Departments. The CCG will generally be convened for rising tide incidents (LEVEL 1) where the establishment of the group follows a period where the development of the threat has been closely monitored.

9.7 The CCG will be chaired by a senior Welsh Government official and comprise largely of representatives from Welsh Government Departments augmented by representatives from key organisations appropriate to the emergency.

## **Wales Civil Contingencies Committee (WCCC)**

9.8 Where the CCG decides that the pan-Wales response should be escalated to LEVEL 2 the group will be re-constituted as the WCCC and will generally comprise representatives from the key Category 1 and 2 responders and others as appropriate. The WCCC will be convened immediately at LEVEL 2 for sudden impact emergencies requiring urgent pan-Wales co-ordination or support.

9.9 The WCCC will act primarily as an advisory body to assess and advise on a particular emergency affecting Wales.

9.10 A WCCC can be called by the Welsh Government at the request of a SCG, partner agency or COBR. When an emergency is clearly a devolved matter the Welsh Government can convene the WCCC. That decision will be taken by the nominated Lead Official.

## **Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE)**

9.11 SAGE coordinates scientific and technical advice from expert groups to help support UK cross-government decision making. SAGE may be activated from within the UK government's crisis management mechanism, often referred to as the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR). SAGE advice will be one source of advice that will be presented to Ministers to support them in making evidence-based decisions. SAGE will be chaired by the UK government's Chief Scientific Adviser (CSA), a departmental or national CSA, Chief Medical Officer (CMO) or CVO as appropriate. The secretariat will be provided by the lead government department. Where there is no lead the secretariat will be provided by Cabinet Office and the Government Office for Science.

9.12 SAGE may establish a number of sub-groups depending upon the nature of the outbreak.

9.13 Existing advisory groups (i.e. government agencies, national or department led advisory groups or external groups) can in an emergency:

- become SAGE – where they are able to provide advice on all issues required and where they contain a full range of appropriate experts.
- form a sub-group of SAGE – where they are able to provide advice on a subset of the issues required and where they contain a full range of appropriate experts on those issues.
- regularly communicate with SAGE – where maintaining the independence of the group is considered essential or beneficial.

## **Animal Disease Policy Group (ADPG)**

9.14 The ADPG provides disease control policy advice and strategy recommendations at UK level which will form the basis for advice to Ministers, the



NSC (THRC) and other strategic decision makers. It is the forum where disease control policy and strategic recommendations should be presented, reviewed, discussed, challenged and agreed by UK officials. ADPG also has an important role in ensuring that policies are consistent (although they may be different) across the four UK administrations.

9.15 ADPG is chaired by Defra's Director for Animal and Plant Health and Defra's EDPRT provides the secretariat. The membership of ADPG includes representatives from Defra policy teams, Communications Group, Defra Legal Advisers (Animal Health and Welfare Team), CVO UK, Defra CSA's representative, NEG, CVOs and policy officials from Devolved Governments, Government Office for Science, CCS and APHA. Membership may also include public health representatives (who provide specific advice on zoonotic diseases).

9.16 The issues that are likely to be discussed include policy recommendations for Ministers, disease control strategy advice to be given to COBR, science based policy decisions and the identification of risks and issues for scenarios that may have an impact upon strategies under consideration.

### **Daily Communication Meeting**

9.17 The Daily Communications meeting is a daily forum for identifying and agreeing key points to make for communications (internal and external) and media briefing and ensuring that the appropriate audiences are reached.

### **Daily Strategic Stocktake**

9.18 The Daily Strategic Stocktake is a forum for ensuring senior managers within the disease control operation are aware of the latest developments and able to plan and take decisions on the overall strategic direction.

9.19 The CVO UK will chair the meeting and the CVO UK's office will provide the secretariat. The membership will include the Director of Animal Health and Welfare, DCVO UK, Chief Executive APHA, CVOs and senior policy leads of the Devolved Governments, Defra's Exotic Disease Policy Lead, Head of VENDU, Outbreak Operations Director, Outbreak Veterinary Director, Head of Veterinary & Technical Operations, a member of the NEEG Executive, Head of International Relations, and economic / industry representatives as appropriate.

9.20 The issues that are likely to be discussed are recent developments and the overall strategic direction of the response.

### **National Experts Group (NEG)**

9.21 The NEG is an ongoing operational UK group which, in an outbreak of exotic notifiable animal disease, provides UK policy teams and CVOs with specific veterinary, technical and scientific advice and recommendations on the disease, its transmission and options for its control via the ADPG, CVO and DCVO UK.

9.22 The NEG will convene where a request on a policy development or option from policy teams or a CVO requires specific advice. The NEG will be chaired by the APHA Head of Advice Services, Veterinary Directorate or representative and the APHA Veterinary Advice Services (VAS) team will provide the secretariat.

9.23 The attendees at each NEG will reflect the issues under consideration but will usually include veterinary and scientific representatives from VAS, Devolved Governments, NEEG, APHA (such as Outbreak Operations Director, Outbreak Veterinary Director), the relevant laboratory (APHA Weybridge or the Pirbright Institute), other Defra agencies and policy officials as observers, Legal and economists may be present.

9.24 Depending on the issue under discussion other attendees may include, modelling experts, meteorologists, scientific or veterinary, representatives of imports and exports portfolios and scientific experts in required fields, e.g. vector biology, may also be invited. These can be from within government, agencies or from external organisations, e.g. wildlife groups, academia etc.

9.25 The issues that are likely to be discussed at a NEG may include disease control recommendations for ADPG such as the use of vaccination, risk of disease transmission, involvement of wildlife, role of vectors and the commissioning of additional specialist work if existing models do not provide a sufficient understanding of the outbreak.

### **Outbreak Advisory Group (OAG)**

9.26 The OAG may be set up during an outbreak or on other occasions if deemed appropriate. It will not normally operate during business as usual. The main function of the OAG is to review the disease control strategy, whether it is or can be delivered as intended, and whether it is achieving the intended outcomes. It may also be used where it provides the best forum for allowing interaction between experts within and across disciplines to resolve a specific issue or to supplement the existing advice.

9.27 Once set up, the OAG will review the strategy in place, at intervals agreed as part of planning the battle rhythm that are appropriate to the nature and scale of the disease outbreak. In addition, policy leads, the APHA service delivery director or a CVO/DCVO may request a specific OAG meeting to review or assist in disease outbreak control. A NEG meeting may also recommend that an issue be addressed in an OAG meeting and vice versa.

9.28 The OAG will be chaired by either the DCVO (UK) or the appropriate lead from the devolved Governments and the outbreak administration, planning and resourcing team will provide the secretariat.

9.29 Attendees at OAG meetings will include policy, veterinary, epidemiologist, the relevant reference laboratory representatives that are invited to all meetings supplemented by other invitees to provide expertise in specific skills and disciplines depending on the issues under consideration.

## **The Wales Animal Health and Welfare Framework Group (AHWFG)**

9.30 The [AHWFG](#) is a panel of experts who provide advice to the Welsh Government on the health and welfare of both livestock and companion animals in Wales.

9.31 The Group members have been drawn from a range of backgrounds and have been appointed to ensure that the views of livestock keepers, animal owners and the veterinary profession are reflected in the ten-year framework that seeks to improve animal health and welfare standards across Wales and increase partnership working with animal keepers. Thereby promoting the merits of industry and government working together.

## **GB Core Groups**

9.32 Defra will convene the relevant Core Group for the disease in question at the outset of an outbreak. The purpose is to ensure the Core Group is apprised of the disease situation, and for them to provide advice and guidance to government. Core Group members may raise issues of concern to the industry that need to be addressed at local or national level during the outbreak. They will also be involved in the development of control policies outside of and during outbreaks. The Deputy Director for the Exotic Disease Control (EDC) will chair the Core Group and Defra's EDPRT will provide the secretariat.


## **Stakeholder meetings**

9.33 Stakeholder meetings provide a forum for stakeholders to discuss and influence policy developments and to help steer the strategic direction. Depending on the outbreak a number of additional stakeholder groups may be convened. These include key stakeholders, veterinary stakeholders, retailers and exporters. The issues that are likely to be discussed vary. Stakeholders representing agricultural and rural interests, food supply, consumer organisations and other organisations may be invited. Meetings will be chaired by the Cabinet Secretary for Energy, Planning and Rural Affairs or the CVO Wales.

## **Inter relationship between policy and strategy groups**

9.34 Figure 5, overleaf, provides a diagrammatic representation of the inter-relationships between the policy and strategy groups.

**Figure 5: Diagram of inter-relationships between Policy and Strategy Groups**



## **Tactical Level**

### **NDCC Bird-table Meetings**

9.35 Bird-table meetings for the NDCC and other key parts of the disease control organisation are conducted to:

- provide a structure for the management of the outbreak by meeting regularly
- facilitate the effective management of the outbreak by ensuring communication between all policy, operational, and communications functions involved
- provide brief situation reports on all aspects of the operation to those concerned in its management, which may include operational partners and external stakeholders
- to encourage a coordinated and cooperative response
- identify key emerging issues and allocate responsibility for resolving them and reporting back

9.36 The participants at will be from all the areas involved in the management of the disease control operation, e.g. all NDCC Heads of Team, policy representatives, operational partners and invited stakeholders. The Welsh Government and other devolved administrations attend via teleconference.

9.37 The issues reported on will include an update on current disease status and control measures, situation reports from NDCC team managers, updates from stakeholders and operational partners, a review of outstanding actions from previous bird-tables, the battle rhythm and housekeeping issues.

9.38 Bird-tables are usually held standing up, with participants contributing in the same order each time. Not all the contributions listed are needed at all times in an outbreak. Contributions must be brief, well focused on immediate key issues, should be objective not speculative and be completed as expeditiously as possible.

### **Management Teleconferences**

9.39 Management teleconferences take place between the NDCC, APHA management and the CDCC as well as between the CDCC and FOB management.

9.40 The teleconferences provide a forum for heads of teams involved in the outbreak to communicate and be provided with central direction.


9.41 The issues that are likely to be discussed include a national update, current situation, control measures, operational and policy issues, resources, communications, IT / data, actions and issues requiring escalation.

## ECC (W) Bird-table Meetings

9.42 Bird-table meetings will be held in the ECC (W) chaired by the Situation Director with secretariat provided by the Directors Cell). For purpose see above.

9.43 The order of participant contributions at the ECC (W) bird-table meeting is illustrated in figure 6 below:

**Figure 6 - Participant contributions at ECC (W) bird-table meetings**



Please note that the actual participants may be subject to change dependent upon the incident or outbreak concerned and so this is provided for illustrative purposes of the indicative order.

## Operational Level

### FOB Bird-table Meetings

9.44 FOB Bird-table meetings are conducted for the same purpose as NDCC bird table meetings, referred to above.

9.45 The FOB manager will chair the meetings with the Secretariat provided by the FOB Communications team. Participants at the meetings will represent areas involved in the operational response including the Welsh Government Policy Adviser, FOB management team, all FOB team leaders, operational partners and invited stakeholders. Teleconferencing facilities will be provided as necessary.

9.46 The issues covered will include an update on current disease status and control measures, situation reports from FOB team managers, updates from stakeholders and operational partners, a review of outstanding actions from previous bird-tables, the battle rhythm and housekeeping issues.

### Battle Rhythm

9.47 The battle rhythm is established to enable all participants to be aware of the daily activities and meetings. The battle rhythm set out below is **indicative**. These timings are for an outbreak of significant size in which a NSC (THRC) is established and a daily media briefing is the norm. Any deviation from the set battle rhythm must be agreed between the Head of the OCG and the CVO UK, the Director of Animal Health and Welfare and the Chief Executive APHA.

Time	Level	Event
0800 – 0830	Strategic	Daily Strategic Stocktake
	Operational	Daily Management & Communications Meeting
0830 – 0900	Tactical	NDCC Bird-table
	Operational	FOB Bird-table
0900 – 0930	Tactical	Daily Communications Meeting
0930 – 1000	Tactical	CVO (W)'s Daily Review
1000 – 1100	Strategic	NSC (THRC)
1000 – 1030	Tactical	ECC (W) Bird-table
1130 – 1200	Strategic	Defra Media Briefing
	Operational	Media Briefing
1200 – 1230	Tactical	NDCC Bird-table
	Operational	FOB Bird-table
1230 – 1300	Tactical	ECC (W) Bird-table
1300 – 1330	Tactical/Operational	CVO(W)/ Situation Director /Policy Adviser catch-up
1400 – 1430	Tactical / Operational	CDCC Management Teleconference
1500 – 1600	Strategic	NSC (THRC)
1700 – 1730	Tactical	ECC (W) Bird-table
1800 – 1830	Tactical	NDCC Bird-table
	Operational	FOB Bird-table
1800	Tactical	ECC (W) Sitrep sent to NDCC Management Information & Reporting Team
2100 (approx.)	NDCC MI & Report	Issue daily report
Ad-hoc	Strategic	Animal Disease Policy Group
	Tactical	National Experts Group
	Operational	Disease Emergency Response Committee

9.48 Where an outbreak is small or events are slow moving a more condensed battle rhythm will be appropriate. The main point is to ensure that a schedule is set and understood by all.

## 10. Communications

### Communications Objective

10.1 For each notifiable exotic animal disease outbreak or incident it is important that there are effective, timely and accurate communications with the affected premises,, farmers, stakeholders, operational partners, the public and the media. Appropriate communications tools, including social media, will be used to assist in conveying key messages and to provide accurate, timely updates on the latest situation.

### Media, livestock keepers and the general public.

10.2 As part of the NDCC, the EDPRT gathers information on the disease outbreak to provide accurate and timely information to Ministers, the media, senior officials, helplines and all staff dealing directly with the public and for publication via websites. It informs relevant stakeholders of the presence of disease and progress in dealing with the outbreak. Whilst the NDCC Communication teams provide the lead for GB, communications in Wales will be coordinated by the Welsh Government Communication Team within the ECC (W).

10.3 The Defra Communications Group aims to provide appropriate, clear and accurate information to key audiences. It also informs and coordinates government information, identifies early any issues of key interest to the media and public, manages communications with the media and assist policy colleagues with key messages, delivers timely, integrated communications advice to Ministers, provides key messages to staff liaises with the Welsh Government and local communications teams.

10.4 The APHA team within the Defra communications group has lead responsibility for managing communications with animal keepers, operational partners and stakeholders at the local level. One of the main methods of communication is via a mass messaging system, using contact data held by APHA and the RCVS. This system allows a combination of SMS, voicemail, email etc to be sent to livestock keepers and veterinary practices. APHA Communications also manages the distribution of information packs to livestock premises within Protection Zone (PZs) and Surveillance Zones (SZs) set up to control livestock diseases.

10.5 All animal keepers, including pet owners should visit [www.Wales.gov.uk](http://www.Wales.gov.uk) and / or [www.Gov.UK](http://www.Gov.UK) during an outbreak, where they will be directed to the latest advice.

10.6 A daily communications meeting is held at the NDCC (including representatives from APHA, Defra, the Welsh Government, and other Devolved Governments as appropriate) to identify and agree key points to make for internal and external communications.



## **Internal Communications**

10.7 During a notifiable exotic animal disease outbreak or incident it is important that all staff involved are kept informed of both the operational progress of the response and key messages.

### **Communication within the NDCC**

10.8 Depending on the size, location, scale and nature of the outbreak or incident there may be stakeholder and operational partner representation in the NDCC, as appropriate.

10.9 Representatives from major stakeholder groups may be invited to attend NDCC bird-table meetings and can attend various other meetings arranged for stakeholders.

### **Communication within the FOB**

10.10 Each FOB will contain a communications team who will liaise closely with the Welsh Government and NDCC Communication' Teams and provide an integrated communications service at the local level.

### **Operational Partners and Stakeholders**

10.11 During disease outbreaks, operational partners will be part of the operational level response and be part of the FOB if appropriate and necessary. In addition, local stakeholder groups will be established within the FOB. These groups will help inform local decision making as appropriate and will assist in ensuring that developments in local operations are communicated to relevant parties, including those who are not engaged with industry groups and sector councils. One way in which stakeholders can help is by referring individuals to [www.Wales.gov.uk](http://www.Wales.gov.uk) and [www.Gov.UK](http://www.Gov.UK), which will have information and links to other sources of information, including social media.

# 11. Working with operational partners and stakeholders

## Operational Partners and Stakeholders

11.1 During disease outbreaks operational partners may form part of the operational response and be part of the FOB if appropriate. In addition, local stakeholder groups will be established within the FOB. These groups will help inform local decision making and will assist in communicating developments in local operations to all relevant parties.

11.2 Depending on the location, scale and nature of the outbreak or incident there may be stakeholder and operational partner representation in the ECC (W). They may be invited to attend ECC (W) bird-table meetings and can attend various other meetings arranged for stakeholders.

## Natural Resources Wales (NRW)

11.3 NRW works with the Welsh Government, and supports partners (including, APHA, local authorities and landowners) to minimise the environmental impact of an outbreak in Wales. NRW provide expert advice and management options, in particular on waste and disposal sites, determine applications and registrations for waste disposal and recovery activities (including carcasses, animal by-products, manures and wash waters), provide advice on pollution prevention issues and monitor the impact of the outbreak on the environment. This includes working with specialist advisers in the Department for Health & Social Services and the Land, Nature and Forestry Division.

11.4 During outbreaks NRW will provide Liaison Officers at the ECC (W) and FOBs. NRW will, where necessary, attend WCCC and SCG meetings.

11.5 NRW has a role for co-ordinating air quality monitoring data for major incidents, and it performs this role with Public Health Wales, Public Health England Centre for Radiation and Environmental Hazards CRCE, local authorities, the Met Office and other organisations. During such incidents an Air Quality Cell may be established which will provide advice and information covering air quality issues.

## Public Health Wales (PHW)

11.6 PHW assess the impact of disease control measures on public health and ensure directors of public health in Local Health Boards are briefed on disease control measures and any related public health issues. PHW will deal with health-related enquiries from public and local health service staff, liaise with Public Health England to promote continuity of health care provision in restricted infected areas, assist in the analysis of human blood samples and provide laboratory support, epidemiological advice and access to modelling capability.

11.7 PHW's roles as a category 1 responder include;

- Assessing the impact on population health and health services.

- Recommending measures to protect public health and mitigate the effects of the incident, as appropriate.
- Where necessary providing strategic management of the public health measures and leading the operational public health management of the incident.
- Arranging epidemiological follow-up along with or on behalf of the Local Health Board if necessary.
- Providing prevention, detection, diagnosis, treatment and control of communicable (zoonotic) disease.
- Liaison with other organisations, such as the Local Health Boards, local authorities, NRW, police, ambulance and other category 1 responders as required.
- Advise on the effective communication of public health risks to others, including the public, media and operational staff.

11.8 During outbreaks PHW may provide representatives at the ECC (W) and FOBs and attend Bid-table briefings. PHW will, where necessary, also attend CCG/WCCC and Strategic Co-ordinating Group meetings.

### **Food Standards Agency (FSA)**

11.9 The FSA is responsible for providing advice to Ministers, regulators, industry and the public concerning implications for the food chain arising from an outbreak of exotic animal disease. The agency will produce guidance on food safety based upon the very latest scientific information and is responsible for assessing the level of risk to the consumer.

11.10 The FSA is responsible for providing enforcement advice and support to local authorities who have responsibility for other food and feed law enforcement. The FSA is also responsible for the protection of public and animal health through their proportionate enforcement of legislation in relation to approved fresh meat premises and through their dairy hygiene component, which has responsibility over cow's raw drinking milk. It is responsible for verifying that operators of approved abattoirs, cutting plants and game handling establishments in GB fulfil their responsibilities for the production of safe meat and the protection of animal health and welfare.

### **The National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC)**

11.11 The National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) is responsible for developing policing policies. The council works within a tripartite framework which brings together the local Chief Constable, the local Police Authority and the Home Secretary.

11.12 During an outbreak of a notifiable exotic animal disease The National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) will:-

- Ensure representation within the ECC (W) and attend Bird-table briefings.
- Advise on strategic policing issues arising from disease control operations and provide a link to Chief Constables in affected Police Forces.

- Facilitate agreement of proposed transport routes with all affected police forces.
- Attend CCG/WCCC meetings, if necessary.

## **Police Forces**

11.13 In addition to their wider role in relation to maintaining order and protecting the public, individual police forces will fulfil a number of specific roles in relation to an animal disease outbreak including policing of control zones, enforcement of movement controls with LAs, providing general co-ordination of emergencies support particularly in pursuing legal entry to premises, providing specialist knowledge in the area of management and co-ordination of major incidents and work in partnership with local authorities and APHA to share and consider local intelligence. A chief officer from the force area affected is usually the chair of the SCG and may be the chair if an outbreak or the activities needed to deal with it reach such proportions that a critical or major incident is declared and the SCG becomes established

## **Welsh Local Government Association (WLGA)**

11.14 The WLGA represents the local authorities of Wales. It also represents the fire authorities, police authorities and National Park authorities. During an outbreak of a notifiable exotic animal disease the WLGA will:-

- Confirm emergency contact points;
- Alert Local Authority Chief Executives; and
- Provide representation at the ECC (W) attend Bird-table meetings, as necessary.

## **Local Authorities (LAs)**

11.15 LAs are major operational partners in the response to an outbreak of a notifiable exotic animal disease. They play a key role in enforcement and the implementation of disease control strategies and are fundamental to rapid and efficient access to local information and resources. They also fulfil a significant role in providing advice and education at a local level. During an outbreak of a notifiable exotic animal disease LAs will:-

- Assist APHA and the Welsh Government with the provision of resources such as staff, vehicles, equipment and buildings, where necessary. The level of assistance will depend on local circumstances and other pressures which may arise.
- Erect road signs for publicising the Protection and Surveillance Zones around a premises where foot and mouth disease or other diseases have been confirmed.
- The enforcement of most animal health and welfare legislation, including movement restrictions / licensing, enforcement within control zones.
- Liaising with LA Emergency Planning Officers for implementation of contingency plans, assistance with establishing disease outbreak 'incident rooms'.
- Closing and reopening rights of way.

- Responding to enquiries from farmers, industry and the general public.
- Monitoring livestock welfare especially during transport and at markets.
- Providing assistance with control of cleansing and disinfection of infected premises and licensed animal gatherings.
- Maintaining effective liaison with other local operational partners.
- Providing an appropriate representative to attend the FOB.
- Giving advice on enforcement.
- Proactively disseminating advice and education to local communities through established communication channels.
- Liaising with the Association of Chief Trading Standards Officers to ensure an awareness of national guidance is maintained, and ensuring major issues are reported and resolved at a national level.

## **RSPCA Cymru**

11.16 The Royal Society for the Protection of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA) is the largest animal welfare organisation and it has the ability to deliver information and services due to the extensive network of field staff, which includes Inspectors, Animal Collection Officers and Animal Welfare Officers. These officers are all on the national airwaves systems and instantly contactable through RSPCA and police means. The RSPCA can assist in ensuring that the appropriate account is taken of the welfare of animals in the containment and eradication of disease. In a disease outbreak the RSPCA in Wales is committed to provide the following minimum resources:

- A special 24 hour hotline number for advice and assistance.
- RSPCA scientists, who can offer advice on welfare policy decisions.
- Brokerage - facilitate the movement of resources and assistance to livestock owners in need.
- Welfare Assessment - Inspectors can assist in appraising welfare situations, enabling effective prioritisation and averting welfare cases.
- Officers which are trained in all aspects of welfare and in particular in a disease situation who may assist with their dart gun skills.
- In certain circumstances officers who may attend large scale culling to assist in the operational planning aspects.

## **Hybu Cig Cymru – Meat Promotion Wales (HCC)**

11.17 HCC is responsible for the development, promotion and marketing of Welsh red meat. HCC works with all sectors of the red meat supply chain in Wales including farmers, livestock markets, abattoirs and processors. In addition to experienced staff, HCC also has an established network of industry contacts and farmer groups who can be called upon to distribute information, if required. In the event of an outbreak, HCC can assist in facilitating the flow of accurate information to the industry.

11.18 HCC's own staff are available to work alongside and assist the Welsh Governments animal health and welfare, communications and marketing teams, and offer expert advice on industry issues.

## **Military Liaison / Involvement of the Armed Forces**

11.19 The Armed Forces may deploy a Joint Regional Liaison Officer (JRLO) to the ECC (W) and Military Liaison Officers may be posted to the ECC(W) to take on a local strategic co-ordination function. Military JRLOs also attend Wales Resilience Partnership Team and commanding officers attend the Wales Resilience Forum.. They are an important link when considering the involvement of the Armed Forces under Military Assistance to Civilian Authority arrangements.

## **12. Premises and Area Restrictions and Movement Controls**

### **Overview**

12.1 A report of suspicion of exotic notifiable disease triggers an official investigation by APHA, which places temporary statutory restrictions on the premises. Initial verbal restrictions are confirmed in writing if disease cannot be ruled out by clinical examination carried out by an APHA Veterinary Inspector (VI).

12.2 Depending on the disease concerned these restrictions may apply to the whole premises or to individual animals. This would usually include a ban on the movement of susceptible animals on and off the suspect premises and may include restrictions on anything that is liable to transmit disease, e.g. meat, products, equipment, vehicles.

12.3 Restrictions on the premises remain in place until the official investigations are complete and a notifiable exotic animal disease can be ruled out.

12.4 During the suspicion phase of certain diseases (particularly for Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD), possibly Avian Influenza (AI), Classical or African Swine Fever (CSF/ASF) and African Horse Sickness (AHS)) a temporary control zone (TCZ) may also be declared around the premises under suspicion if samples are taken for examination. Zone specific measures will apply and it will be of a size considered necessary to address the risk of spread.

12.5 If disease is confirmed, the primary objective is to prevent the spread of disease by:

- Taking action on the Infected Premises (IP) and other premises where disease is most likely to have spread from and to (e.g. those linked by recent animal or other movements with the IP)
- Imposing, for many diseases, wider area based controls as required by EU and national legislation including animal movement controls and controls on animal products (in the case of FMD in particular, GB administrations will impose national movement restrictions on susceptible animals) taking into account the risk of disease spread
- Restricting activities that might increase the risk of spread (e.g. there might be a ban on hunting or shooting)
- Considering banning gatherings of animals e.g. at shows

- Considering export bans
- Investigating the origin of the disease and determining whether there has been further spread of disease from that source
- Other surveillance to investigate possible further spread of disease

12.6 The types of zones that may be employed along with details of their minimum sizes and duration can be found in the relevant Disease Control Strategy.

## **Premises Restrictions**

12.7 The APHA will put in place restrictions on premises to prevent the movement on and off the premises of animals susceptible to the particular disease.

12.8 Depending on the disease concerned, the movement of people, non-susceptible animals, animal products, feed and fodder, vehicles and anything else potentially contaminated with infectious material, off and onto the premises may also be restricted. Subject to legislative requirements, a veterinary risk assessment carried out by APHA and suitable biosecurity procedures being adhered to, they may be allowed to move off and on to the premises under a licence issued by government.

12.9 The rules affecting premises are set out in the notice served on the occupier. Any licence will clearly specify conditions permitting movements onto and off the premises or restricted place. The occupier of the premises is responsible for ensuring that the restrictions are observed.

12.10 Rights of way (e.g. footpaths, bridleways, etc.) or land to which the public have a right of access may be closed on the IP.

## **Area Restrictions**

12.11 In any exotic notifiable disease outbreak or incident, there will initially be a degree of uncertainty about the origin of the disease, how long it has been present and its spread. Therefore, area restrictions are imposed for many diseases to stop the movement of susceptible animals into, from and within the restricted area.

12.12 During the suspicion phase of certain diseases a Temporary Control Zone (TCZ) may be declared around the premises under suspicion.

12.13 The policy on confirmation of many notifiable exotic animal diseases is for government to impose a PZ, surrounded by a larger SZ) around the IP. Controls within the PZ would be more stringent than those within the SZ to reflect the increased risk of transmission of disease.

12.14 For those diseases where confirmation would not result in the imposition of a PZ and SZ, legislation and the relevant disease control strategy provide for the possibility to impose other types of controlled zones. Although known by various terms, their main objective is to reduce the risk of disease spreading beyond the area that is affected. For example in the case of rabies, an infected area may be put

in place and may be sub-divided into further zones, each with their own set of controls.

## **Controls and Restrictions in the PZ and SZ**

12.15 In general, controls are primarily focused on animal movements since, for most diseases, this is the most common means of spreading disease. Legislation may include controls on vehicles, fomites (i.e. anything that may physically carry the disease agent), meat, animal products (including meat products, eggs, hides and in some cases milk and milk products derived from animals in the zones) and animal carcasses.

12.16 Animal keepers within the control zones may be required to carry out additional biosecurity measures. All animal keepers must be especially vigilant for any signs of disease and immediately report any suspicion of disease to APHA.

12.17 APHA will carry out surveillance when the zones are in place. This will involve clinical inspection, examination and possibly sampling for laboratory testing in the areas to identify infected animals and demonstrate that disease has not spread. In extensive outbreaks or incidents, where a large number of PZ and SZ areas may be declared, the areas may overlap to form a very large PZ and SZ. This may increase the time needed to carry out the required surveillance to allow restrictions to be lifted and demonstrate disease freedom.

12.18 Where restrictions are imposed, government will monitor their impact on rural communities and the wider rural economy.

## **Changes to Movement Controls**

### **Licensing**

12.19 As investigations into an outbreak or incident progresses, it will become clearer where the risks of disease spread lie.

12.20 Depending on the circumstances and subject to a veterinary risk assessment and the statutory requirements, government may grant exemptions to controls for specific limited individual movements using specific licences. These licences will clearly set out the criteria (e.g. veterinary inspection, cleansing and disinfection, monitoring, etc.) that would need to be met before, during or after the move.

12.21 Each UK administration operates its own licensing regime. Co-ordination and co-operation between administrations provides a coherent approach to moves across administrative borders. Each administration will discuss its strategy for exit from movement controls with relevant stakeholders and identify priorities for change, subject to risk assessment, the disease situation and conformity with the requirements of the legislative framework. General licences will be employed to implement phased lifting of movement controls as the disease situation becomes clearer.



12.22 Government will keep stakeholders and animal keepers informed of the disease situation. Government will also publish information about the likely timing of changes to restrictions within zones. Control Strategies and legislation already set out the minimum duration of zones and controls within them.

12.23 It is important that all animal keepers have contingency plans in place to deal with prolonged movement restrictions, because pressure on accommodation can arise quickly, particularly for the pig and poultry sectors. The animal keeper is responsible for the welfare of their animals. Where there is suffering due to overcrowding the keeper may have to humanely cull those animals. No compensation would be payable for any animals culled as a result. In exceptional circumstances, consideration will be given to arranging disposal where this may be a problem for the keeper.

12.24 Immediately following the imposition of movement controls, consideration will be given to making licences available to permit certain movements for welfare purposes (e.g. dairy cow movements for milking, movements to permit treatment by veterinary surgeons, etc.) subject to assessment of the risk. The conditions of these licences aim to ensure that such moves take place under suitable biosecurity arrangements.

## **Enforcement**

12.25 Local Authorities in Wales enforce the area movement restrictions and the licensing conditions.

## **Access to the countryside within zones**

12.26 The risks of disease being spread between groups of animals by those seeking recreational access to the countryside are very small and can be reduced further by avoiding direct contact with animals. In the event of a disease outbreak, there will be a presumption in favour of access to the countryside, subject to a veterinary risk assessment.

12.27 Government will ensure clear advice is available at national and local level to ensure the public are aware of what areas are accessible.

## **International controls and controls on animal products**

12.28 In the event of a disease outbreak or incident and depending on the disease, the UK may lose its OIE international disease free status. This may result in some countries no longer accepting animals or their products from the UK.

12.29 Within the EU, depending on the disease, there may also be a ban on intra-community trade of susceptible animals, animal products, meat or meat products and milk and dairy products from the whole country or parts of it. These products may not be traded within the community but subject to the disease and any movement restrictions in place, they may be traded on the domestic market if stamped appropriately with a specific domestic health mark.

12.30 In the case of trade with third countries (i.e. countries that are not members of the EU or the European Free Trade Association (EFTA)), export certificates may be withdrawn until the situation has been clarified with the importing country.

12.31 Government and stakeholders will need to work closely, from the start of an outbreak and possibly during the suspicion stage, on communicating with trading partners in order to minimise the impact on trade. This may require a long-term commitment. Trade restrictions can be in place for a long time, even after the disease itself has been eradicated and disease free status has been restored.

## **Regionalisation**

12.32 Depending on the disease situation it may be possible, following a risk assessment, to divide the country into areas defined as free of disease, low risk and high risk. This would allow the relaxation of some controls and allow additional movements within an area of the same status and from free or low risk areas to high risk areas. Regionalisation is dependent on a range of factors including the epidemiology of the disease, accurate up to date information on its geographical distribution and seasonal trade patterns. Laboratory surveillance may be required to demonstrate freedom from disease in a region.

12.33 Proposals to regionalise must be acceptable to the other UK administrations, the European Commission and other trading partners. Regionalisation would also impose restrictions on animal and animal product movements to maintain the region's disease status. This may have an adverse economic effect that outweighs any short term advantage of regionalisation and economic considerations must be taken into account in coming to decisions on regionalisation.

## **Compartmentalisation**

12.34 EU legislation enables intra-community trade to resume relatively quickly once a disease is under control. However, the resumption of trade with third country trading partners can take considerably longer.

12.35 Compartmentalisation is a concept that allows companies, in the event of a disease outbreak, to resume trade quickly with Member States and / or 'third countries' who have signed up to the scheme. Companies must meet the conditions of [EC Regulation 616/2009](#), which includes strict biosecurity measures and the requirement for premises to be approved by government.

## 13. Operations and Logistics

### Contracts, framework agreements and finance

13.1 In the event of an outbreak of exotic notifiable disease of animals it is important that services required as part of the disease control operation can be accessed rapidly. Defra Network Procurement (NP) and APHA establish contractual arrangements to meet anticipated needs in an outbreak whilst ensuring compliance with EU and UK procurement law and value for money. The suppliers are vetted and are subjected to regular review by NP and APHA to ensure their on-going suitability for use in an outbreak.

13.2 The contracts and framework agreements and arrangements are subject to regular review and cover all of the relevant supply chains and include: valuation, on-farm culling (including catchers and licensed slaughtermen); carcase transportation; carcase disposal (rendering and incineration); and the provision of specialist services and equipment for undertaking C&D.

13.3 The Network Procurement Central Outbreak Team (PERTCO) will be responsible for negotiating robust contracts with any other suppliers that are not already on framework agreements during an outbreak should the extent of the outbreak require additional supply.

13.4 HoFD / WAOM / field teams liaise with Defra Network Procurement and NDCC Field operations teams to ensure timely, scalable and appropriate supply arrangements in the event of an outbreak of an animal disease covered by this plan.

### Depopulation

13.5 For many diseases the control policy is to humanely cull affected animals rapidly (depopulate the premises where disease is confirmed), to halt the production or transmission of the disease causing agent. For livestock diseases, this may involve the humane culling of whole flocks / herds of animals. For other diseases only single animals may need to be humanely culled.

13.6 Depopulation operations are controlled by [EU Regulation \(EC\) 1099/2009](#), the Protection of Animals at the Time of Killing (PATOK), and carried out under the supervision of APHA. The [Welfare of Animals at Time Killing \(Wales\) Regulations 2014](#) (WATOK), enforces the requirements of the European Regulation

13.7 Carcases and any other potentially infective items (e.g. eggs, milk) must be disposed of in a safe, bio-secure manner and in compliance with the [Animal By-products \(Enforcement\) \(Wales\) Regulations 2014](#), at a designated disposal facility. APHA is responsible for arranging the depopulation and disposal of affected animals across GB.

13.8 While the speed of depopulation and disposal is important, the health and safety of personnel, keepers and owners is paramount and careful preparations are put in place by APHA to ensure that their health and safety is not compromised. This is particularly important in the case of animal diseases that are communicable to

humans (zoonoses) and Public Health Wales will advise on the precautions to be taken on affected premises or those dealing with potentially infected animal by-products.

13.9 It is important that animal welfare is protected and that rules are complied with at every stage in the process of depopulation. However, in exceptional circumstances, compliance with those rules may put human health at risk or may significantly slow down the process of eradication of a disease, thereby exposing more animals to sickness, pain and death. On occasion, there may be a need to derogate from the approved culling methods as prescribed in the EC Regulation 1099/2009.

13.10 Depopulation, as a disease control measure, where appropriate, is carried out under the supervision of an APHA veterinarian. Such activities will be undertaken by suitably qualified and licenced persons, who will be contracted by APHA. A range of framework agreements are in place with these suppliers.

13.11 The welfare of the animals to be culled is given careful consideration and is taken into account when selecting the most suitable depopulation method as outlined in Annex 1 of the EC Regulation 1099/2009. The method deployed will depend on the type of incident, species, age, number of animals, and any other site-specific conditions or resource constraints.

13.12 The following are the main culling methods for livestock and companion animals that APHA will consider:

- Lethal injection.
- Electrical stun/kill.
- Captive bolt followed by pithing.
- Free bullet.
- Sedation (followed by one of the above methods).

13.13 It is considered highly unlikely that there would be a need to seek any derogation to the approved methods outlined in Annex 1 of 1099/2009 for depopulating livestock premises.

13.14 For birds the main culling methods that the APHA will consider are:

- Lethal injection.
- Neck dislocation (limits apply regarding bird weight and number of birds culled per person).
- Percussion killing.
- Electrical stun/kill.
- Exposure to anoxic gas mixtures.
- Maceration (limited to chicks up 72 hours old).

13.15 If a notifiable avian disease is confirmed, APHA has a number of Containerised Gassing Units (CGU) for immediate deployment with the ability to source additional units through framework agreements, as well as a number of poultry transport modules and specialist percussion killers. Depending on the suitability of the premises, APHA may also consider the use of whole house gassing

for culling housed poultry. The use of gas-filled foam (wet foam) has been validated and has also been investigated. APHA hold framework agreements with various sectors of the poultry industry, for example, poultry catching gangs and culling contractors to assist in the depopulation operations.

13.16 It is possible that a derogation may be made on a case-by-case basis under EU Regulation (EC) 1099/2009 seeking alternate means of depopulating poultry premises. An example of when this may occur is when highly pathogenic avian influenza has been confirmed in multiple premises in poultry dense areas and:

- There is a significant threat to public health through animal to human transmission.
- All other depopulation methods from the list above have been investigated and ruled out.
- Where delays in depopulating the premises would lead to further animal welfare issues (e.g. prolonged pain and suffering).
- Where delays to the depopulation operation would significantly slow down the process of eradication of disease.

13.17 In this instance, the Welsh Government may exceptionally consider the use of alternate depopulation methods not listed as approved in Annex 1 of 1099/2009.

13.18 Certain limited categories of animals/birds (e.g. rare species, which could compromise the existence of a particular species or animals part of a scientific experiment) may be considered for sparing from culling, provided that disease control is not compromised. However, such exemptions are not guaranteed and will be considered on a case-by-case basis following a veterinary risk assessment of the premises and consideration of wider issues and impacts.

### **Breeds at Risk**

13.19 Special arrangements may be made for animals and poultry on the UK Breeds at Risk List. The list of breeds is compiled by the Farm Animal Genetic Resources (FAnGR) Committee, a UK government committee, in which the Welsh Government participate, providing advice on farm animal genetic resources. The UK Breeds at Risk list is available [here](#). Keepers can find out more information about registering their flock or herd [here](#):

13.20 Good biosecurity practices may significantly improve the likelihood that derogation is granted for listed breeds of animals and poultry.

### **Culling of Animals to Prevent the Spread of Disease**

13.21 The Welsh Ministers also have the power to require the preventive culling of animals in order to prevent the spread of FMD, Avian Influenza and Newcastle Disease.

13.22 Before such powers are used, the Welsh Ministers will make a statement explaining the situation and why it is necessary to resort to using such powers. Such powers would only be used in exceptional circumstances. Compensation will be paid for any animals culled under these powers.

## Disposal Policy and Arrangements

13.23 In consultation with policy officials, NRW, EA LAs and disposal industry representatives, the NDCC Field Operations Team will co-ordinate the task of finding and using available disposal capacity in GB. Responsibility for transporting the carcasses to these facilities rests with the FOB Disposals Team in liaison with the NDCC. Decisions on which site to use will take account of relevant legislation, value for money, the proximity of the facilities to the affected premises, logistical and seasonal issues, the tonnage of carcase material that needs to be disposed of and any epidemiological data or modelling which may suggest the likely scale of the outbreak.

13.24 Taking into account the above, and as a guide, the Welsh Government's preferred hierarchy of disposal options for carcasses is:

- Commercial fixed plant incineration;
- Rendering (Category 1 and 2 animal by-product approved); and
- Permitted commercial landfill sites.

13.25 Operational protocols for use of incineration, rendering and permitted landfill in an outbreak of an exotic notifiable animal disease have been produced and shared with NRW, the United Kingdom Renderers Association (UKRA), the Foodchain and Biomass Renewables Associations (Fabra) and the Environmental Services Association (ESA).

13.26 FOB staff are responsible for reviewing the selected site's biosecurity and ensuring that the plant complies with the disposal site protocols. For zoonotic diseases, PHW is also involved in assessing the potential exposure of workers, issue guidance and offer prophylaxis as appropriate.

13.27 On-farm pyres and burials may be considered in remote areas (e.g. those covered by the remote area derogation, such as the Caldey Island or Bardsey) if access to other avenues of disposal are limited. Any decision to use these disposal routes will be taken in consultation with key stakeholders and the appropriate environmental and public health assessments will be undertaken at each disposal location prior to use.

13.28 Other disposal options, such as mass burial, air curtain burners, incineration in cement kilns and the use of hazardous or municipal incineration etc. are also potential options in certain limited circumstances, but will only be considered where none of the preferred options are available or if demand exceeds the capacity of the preferred options.

13.29 The Welsh Government recognises that there are several factors that may impact on the disposal hierarchy in the future. These include new environmental or waste management legislation and changes to capacity and accessibility of the disposal outlets. The hierarchy will therefore be regularly reviewed, in consultation with relevant stakeholders, to take account of these issues alongside new and emerging technologies and facilities.

## **Disposal Capacity**

13.30 Disposal capacity is limited and subject to significant seasonal variation. Capacity is also poorly matched to the distribution of poultry and pigs since the main disposal facilities are generally located in areas of high cattle and sheep densities.

13.31 In an outbreak there will be a need to optimise disposal capacity and to work with the disposal industry to either divert existing business to other facilities or to ensure that biosecurity at a facility is rigorous enough to permit existing waste streams to continue to be received alongside infective material. For diseases such as FMD, APHA is likely to require a dedicated disposal site. For some poultry diseases it may be preferable, for operational reasons, for a mixed poultry and mammalian waste stream to be received.

13.32 Additional capacity would be arranged as required in consultation with Fabra. Readily available disposal capacity in the UK is approximately 20,000 tonnes per week depending on the time of year, although additional capacity could be brought on stream over a period of weeks. This would require the diversion of existing waste streams to landfill.

## **Transportation of carcasses**

13.33 Defra has a framework agreement with a range of specialist local, regional and national haulage companies for the provision of European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR) compliant, leak-proof vehicles. For animals culled for disease control purposes, the transport of carcasses is undertaken by companies under the control of APHA.

13.34 There is also an option to put in place a call-off contract to supply a GB transport logistics manager to support local transport manager(s). The local transport managers will be responsible for all transport logistics.

13.35 Vehicles used for the disposal of carcasses will be leak-tested prior to being loaded, suitably signed with hazard warning plates as required by ADR and the carriage of dangerous goods legislation and will travel by a prescribed route to the chosen disposal facility. For highly infectious diseases, each vehicle will also be escorted. The driver will carry a transport incident record card, which advises police and emergency services of any precautions that should be taken in the event of an accident or incident. The driver must also be ADR trained and certified.

## **Cleansing and Disinfection (C&D)**

13.36 Once susceptible animals have been culled and their carcasses securely disposed of, the premises and potentially contaminated transport and equipment must be cleansed and disinfected to prevent spread from the premises and potential re-emergence (recrudescence) of disease when the premises is restocked. Animal feedstuffs and items that may have been contaminated and which cannot be cleansed and disinfected may be seized and destroyed.

**13.37** Potentially contaminated areas must first be cleansed to remove organic material and are then disinfected with an approved disinfectant or biocide at the

recommended rate. [The list of Government Approved disinfectants can be found here.](#)

13.38 NRW provides advice on precautions to be taken on premises undergoing C&D in order to minimise environmental impacts of disinfectants or biocides.

13.39 There are two phases to C&D, preliminary and final (secondary) - these are outlined below.

### **Preliminary Disinfection**

13.40 Preliminary disinfection is carried out immediately after culling and disposal has been completed. It is carried out at Government's expense under the direction and control of APHA. Preliminary disinfection consists of spraying contaminated and potentially contaminated areas where the animals were culled and where they were housed immediately before they were culled with an approved disinfectant or biocide. Preliminary disinfection is considered to be completed 24 hours after the last application of the approved disinfectant.

13.41 The timing of preliminary disinfection is important because, generally, the merging of the PZ and SZ can only take place after a defined number of days following completion of preliminary disinfection on the last infected premises within the zone. This period may vary depending on the disease. If secondary or final cleansing is not conducted, country freedom may be achieved 12 months after the sign off of the preliminary cleansing and disinfection application.

### **Final (Secondary) C&D**

13.42 Depending on the disease, final C&D can only commence following a defined number of days after the preliminary disinfection. The costs associated with the final C&D are the responsibility of the owner of the premises.

13.43 The time of completion of final C&D is also important because for some diseases the earliest date of country freedom is dependent on the completion of final C&D. Restocking is also dependant on the completion date. If secondary or final cleansing is not conducted, country freedom may be achieved 12 months after the sign off of the preliminary cleansing and disinfection application.

13.44 In cases where final C&D cannot be safely or economically completed (dangerous structures, for example), depending on the disease, the premises may remain restricted and not allowed to restock until APHA is satisfied that sufficient time has elapsed for the infectious agent to have become naturally inactivated.



## **14. Valuation and Compensation**

14.1 When an animal is culled for the control of an exotic notifiable disease, the relevant legislation sets out whether compensation is payable and under what circumstances.

14.2 When compensation is payable, it is the Welsh Ministers' duty to determine an appropriate value and for some diseases engage an accredited valuer to value the animal(s). APHA maintains a framework agreement of approved valuers that will enable APHA to value the animal(s). There are certain instances where valuers are not required and Valuation Rate Cards (mainly for poultry) are used. These rates are updated quarterly. However, valuers may still be required to value rare or specialised breeds of livestock.

### **Disputed Valuations**

14.3 Within 14 days of receiving a valuation, animal owners have the opportunity to dispute it. Their appeal, including the reasons for disputing the valuation, must be provided in writing to APHA. At their own expense, the owner may use their own valuer to re-value the animals in question as supporting evidence for their appeal against the original valuation. Any appeal will be processed by the NDCC and may then go to arbitration or for expert determination. The culling of an animal will not be delayed as a consequence of any valuation issues.

### **Monitor Valuers**

14.4 Monitor Valuers appointed under a framework agreement ensure that valuations are fair, equitable and consistent and that government does not pay excessive compensation. These appointments are regularly reviewed. Monitor Valuers may visit FOBs as necessary and provide:

- advice on instructions and guidance to be issued to valuers with the aim of ensuring fairness, uniformity and consistency of valuations.
- a review of valuations on request, including cases for arbitration or expert determination.
- advice, if needed, by a valuer while undertaking a valuation.
- advice to APHA concerning valuers who may appear not to be abiding by instructions or whose valuations appear to be over or under market value.

14.5 However, Monitor Valuers will not be able to over-rule valuations already made and issued to animal owners.

### **European Commission co-financing**

14.6 For many diseases the European Commission provide a subsequent contribution (co-financing) towards the compensation paid to the owners of culled animals and other specific activities at the affected premises. There are strict guidelines and deadlines which must be followed by authorities in order to obtain the full contribution available. The European Commission reserves the right to scrutinise the methodology applied to reach the value of the animals and claims may be

disallowed if a member state cannot demonstrate that compensation rates meet the strict guidelines for co-financing.

## **15. Vaccination**

15.1 Published control strategies explain the likely policy on vaccination for certain diseases. In general, vaccination may be considered as a control tool as part of wider disease control strategies. This can help move towards the overall goal of eradicating the disease where it is practical to do so, and the full benefits outweigh the wider costs. In the short term, vaccination can help slow, reduce and potentially prevent disease spread. At the same time, vaccination can carry with it significant costs for industry and Government, while having wider implications for factors such as effective monitoring of disease spread, trade and movements of animals. Vaccination is disease specific and vaccines may not be available for all exotic notifiable diseases. There will be a range of technical issues to consider as well as many wider issues to balance the costs and benefits of deploying vaccine. Any decision therefore to deploy vaccination as a disease control measure requires very careful consideration.

15.2 In accordance with EU requirements, emergency vaccination plans and control strategies have been prepared for FMD detailing the procedures and vaccination strategies that would be adopted if a decision to vaccinate was taken. A vaccination response might also be considered for other diseases including, but not limited to, Rabies, Bluetongue and AHS.

15.3 A Framework Agreement has established as part of the VDP to provide emergency vaccination services. A range of potential providers are included, whereby one or more companies could be appointed as vaccination contractor to carry out vaccination within Wales. This includes the potential to undertake vaccination for FMD, CSF and for any other diseases for which vaccination is required, under the direction of APHA.

### **FMD - Emergency Vaccination Plan**

15.4 Government will consider from the outset of any outbreak of FMD whether vaccination as an extra control measure would help to control and eradicate the disease in the circumstances relating to the specific outbreak situation. Any decision to deploy vaccination will be finely balanced and need to take into account a wide range of factors.

15.5 Detailed instructions and procedures will be issued to the vaccination contractor outlining their roles and responsibilities.

15.6 APHA has also agreed a health and safety policy which incorporates the need for the contractor, their employees, sub and external contractors to comply with best practice and all relevant provisions, whether statutory or otherwise, relating to health and safety at work, including biosecurity protocols. Specific health and safety training must be provided for all staff at the time of call off.

## **Vaccine supplies**

15.7 In the event of an outbreak and following detailed analysis of the circulating virus, The Pirbright Institute will advise whether there is a suitable antigen in the EU FMD vaccine bank that could prove effective against the field strain. Access to the EU bank will be through a request to the European Commission.

## **Lay vaccination**

15.8 To ensure that emergency vaccination can be implemented without delay in an outbreak, non-veterinary personnel are permitted by law to handle and administer FMD vaccine. Legislation specifically permits vaccine to be supplied to and administered by lay vaccinators who meet specified eligibility criteria.

## **Process**

15.9 In the event of a confirmed outbreak of FMD, APHA will convey the scope and policy of any vaccination project to the contractor(s) and confirm the approach to be taken (including the vaccine delivery arrangements). APHA will also keep the contractor(s) informed of all suspect and confirmed cases as they occur and inform them of any changes which may affect field operations.

15.10 If the decision to vaccinate is taken, a Vaccination Zone will be set up and a Vaccination Surveillance Zone, of at least 10 km in width, surrounding the Vaccination Zone will be designated. APHA will supply the contractor(s) with a complete list of holdings within the Vaccination Zone and identify those with animals that require vaccination.

15.11 The contractor(s) will then contact farmers to arrange pre-vaccination visits by veterinary surgeons appointed by them for this purpose. The visits will check animal handling facilities and will also inspect animals for clinical signs of FMD.


15.12 Where clinical signs of FMD are identified, the teams will be withdrawn from the farms and the agreed biosecurity protocols must be followed. Vaccination teams would then enter a 72 hour quarantine period before being redeployed.

15.13 Where FMD is not found during the pre-vaccination visit, vaccination teams will be deployed to carry out vaccination, record animal identification numbers, collect and return records. Vaccinated animals will be ear-tagged in a manner outlined in the [FMD \(Control of Vaccination\) \(Wales\) Regulations 2006](#).

15.14 For identification purposes, vaccinated cattle will have their details recorded on the cattle passport and their current premises noted on the APHA Notifiable Disease Outbreak Management System (NDOMS).

Figure 7 - Use of emergency vaccination during a FMD outbreak

**Note: Start at top left decision (diamond) box.**



## Classical Swine Fever (CSF) Vaccination

15.15 Vaccination is not a routine control measure. Legislation states that no person shall administer a CSF vaccine to any pig unless authorised to do so by the Welsh Ministers. However, legislation provides powers to implement vaccination if this were necessary.

15.16 In exceptional circumstances, emergency vaccination may be considered. Triggers might include a dramatic increase in the number of premises being confirmed each day or in areas with a high density of pig during a prolonged outbreak. A decision to vaccinate needs to be approved by the Welsh Ministers. Therefore detailed operational arrangements are not in place for a wide scale CSF emergency vaccination programme in the event of an outbreak in Great Britain.

15.17 However, in accordance with our obligations under the provisions of [EU Classical Swine Fever Directive 2001/89/EC](#), a detailed vaccination plan for CSF can be found below.

### CSF - Emergency Vaccination Plan

15.18 In accordance with the provisions of EU CSF Directive 2001/89/EC, the following sets out arrangements for consideration of an emergency vaccination programme.

15.19 Both the EU Directive and domestic legislation permit the use of vaccination as a disease control measure in certain circumstances. The primary disease control measure that would be adopted would be a policy of culling infected and dangerous contact pigs. The option to use vaccination would be considered regularly by the CSF expert group and would take account of Annex VI of Council Directive 2001/89/EC, which lists the main criteria and risk factors to be considered for the decision to apply emergency vaccination in pig holdings.

15.20 A decision to use emergency vaccination would therefore be considered in any of the following circumstances:

- Disease had become well established in the country and there was a dramatic increase in the number of premises being confirmed each day;
- Disease was established in an area with a high density of pigs;
- The predictions from disease modellers and epidemiologists suggest that it would take more than 2 months to bring the outbreak under control; and
- There was a shortage of rendering or incineration capacity such that infected animals or other animals being culled could not be processed after being culled.

15.21 If emergency vaccination was to be adopted, the CSF expert group would consider the extent of the geographical area in which the emergency vaccination is to be carried out and would make recommendations to the relevant CVO. They would also make recommendations on the categories of pigs to be vaccinated and the duration of the vaccination campaign. The latter would be affected by the number of premises to be vaccinated and the availability of vaccine.

15.22 In evaluating potential vaccines it is imperative that they are effective and rapid at stimulating a good protective immunity in the vaccinated animal. It is also important that a vaccinated animal should not become infected when challenged by a field virus as such an animal may then not develop any clinical signs, but still be infectious to other animals as the field virus replicates and contaminates the environment. It is also essential that a vaccine should prevent congenital infections via the trans-placental infection of field virus which could result in persistently infected carriers and shedders of field virus.

15.23 The choice of vaccine to be used would be reviewed by the CSF expert group as they assess evidence relating to new marker vaccines that are produced and marketed and have tests which can effectively differentiate between affected and vaccinated animals.

15.24 A CSF vaccination response would most likely be delivered by contractors under the VDP following a similar process as for FMD.

## **16. Restoration of Disease Freedom and Recovery Phase**

16.1 The response to a disease outbreak does not end when disease freedom is restored. Stamping out disease quickly and restoring disease freedom is vital. The sooner disease is stamped out and disease freedom restored, the sooner normal trade can commence. However, this can be a lengthy process with third countries. It is essential for both government and stakeholders to work on minimising the impact of disease on trade from the start of an outbreak. We also need to work together to minimise the impact on the rural and wider domestic economy.

### **The OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code**

16.2 OIE on behalf of its Member Countries produces the [Terrestrial Animal Health Code](#) (The Code) which is formally adopted at the annual general assembly of all Delegates of OIE Members. The aim of the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code is to assure the sanitary safety of international trade in terrestrial animals (mammals, birds and bees) and their products. This is achieved through the detailing of health measures to be used by the veterinary authorities of importing and exporting countries to avoid the transfer of pathogens to animals or humans, while avoiding unjustified sanitary barriers. The Code sets out, amongst other things, the detailed requirements to claim Country freedom from particular animal diseases. The delegate member of the OIE for the UK is the CVO (UK).

16.3 The Code is now an integral part of the regulatory system established by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) for trade in animals and their products. Veterinary authorities are encouraged to base their import health measures on the OIE standards. In the EU many of the current measures are also based on the OIE standards. Whilst there is no specific legal obligation for EU member states to follow the OIE standards, should a complaint be made to the WTO, failure to comply with the standards could have serious implications for the country concerned.

## **Restocking**

16.4 The controlled restocking of animals onto premises which have had affected animals culled and disposed of is an integral part of the recovery phase. Depending on the disease, restocking is not permitted until a defined number of days have elapsed following the final (secondary) cleansing and disinfection (see the disease control strategies and legislation). With certain diseases there is controlled restocking where limited numbers of animals are allowed on the premises ('sentinel' animals) and observed to ensure disease is no longer present. In some cases, samples are taken from these sentinel animals for laboratory testing to ensure that disease no longer exists on the premises before all restrictions are lifted and the premises allowed to restock completely. For some diseases, or in the event of prolonged outbreaks, or if final cleansing and disinfection is not possible the restocking of a premises may not be possible for several months.

## **Scaling Down – debriefing and lessons identified**

16.5 As part of the recovery phase it will be necessary to scale back on resources once certain parts of the outbreak or incident management response are completed. The CVO UK, the CVO(s) from the affected country or countries, the chief executive of APHA and the head of the OCC in the NDCC. When operations are at a sufficiently low level, they will agree the timing of the closure of the NDCC.

16.6 In Wales the CVO, in discussion with the Situation Director, the Head of ADPB, veterinary advisers, and the Head of OCC will decide the schedule for de-escalating and closing the ECC (W).

## **Debriefing and lessons identified**

16.7 At the conclusion of a disease outbreak it is good practice to conduct debriefings with those involved to capture experiences. The aim is to identify and evaluate where improvements to disease response capability, processes and organisational structures for managing an outbreak of exotic notifiable disease can be made. The feedback from relevant personnel departments, operational partners and stakeholders should be collated into a lessons identified report. The report will provide the framework for improvements of the response to and management of disease outbreaks and the review of contingency plans and operational instructions.

## **Restoration of trade**

16.8 For EU trade, when a disease is detected, restrictions are put in place in line with EC regulations. Once the SCoPAFF are satisfied that the disease has been eradicated, any disease control zones are lifted. Trade can resume provided that any additional safeguard measures imposed on the UK by the EC during an outbreak have also been lifted.

16.9 Export to third countries can remain adversely affected even after the disease outbreak has been tackled and disease freedom has been re-confirmed. Securing the resumption of exports can be protracted and challenging, often involving detailed technical and political negotiations, inward inspection visits, and discussions to agree revised certification rules. Exporters should not therefore assume that re-

confirmation of disease free status automatically means that third country import requirements will revert to those that existed before the disease outbreak. They should contact the APHA Centre for International Trade, Carlisle for information on the latest certification requirements for exports to third countries.

### **Rural and wider economic recovery**

16.10 During the early stages of an outbreak, Defra will set up a board which will specifically consider the wider impacts of disease control measures on rural communities, individuals and businesses, the environment, tourism, industry, agricultural sectors and local authorities. The membership of the board will be tailored to meet the requirements of the outbreak and will include representatives from the relevant teams in APHA, Defra, Welsh Government, and the other devolved administrations and will take advice from local recovery coordination groups, key stakeholders and partners.

16.11 Subject to the nature of the outbreak, and the potential impact, any economic recovery measures will need to be identified at an early stage, usually during the response phase if possible. However, the nature of any intervention will need to be tailored to meet the requirements of the situation (dependent on scale and impact), may be targeted at either specific business sectors and / or geographic areas where trade, movement of goods, services or people may have been restricted or public perception of the impact of the outbreak has / or will have a significant impact (such as potential food safety concerns, or that rural areas not open or accessible).

16.12 Recovery can take years, depending on the disease outbreak, and involve social and developmental recovery in the region as well as getting individual farms and trade back to normal.



## Annex A - List of Notifiable Diseases

A notifiable disease is a disease referred to under section 88 of the [Animal Health Act 1981](#) or an Order made under that Act including:

- Horse Diseases – details of diseases covered by the [Infectious Diseases of Horses Order 1987](#).
- Specified Diseases – details of diseases made compulsorily notifiable by the [Specified Diseases \(Notification and Slaughter\) Order 1992](#) (as amended) and the [Specified Diseases \(Notification\) Order 1996](#) (as amended) to enact European Union Legislation

The Specified Diseases legislation extends the definition of “disease” in section 88 of the Animal Health Act 1981 to include the above diseases.

The following table lists the major notifiable diseases;

Disease (A – C)	Diseases (D – L)	Diseases (N – Z)
African horse sickness	Dourine	Newcastle Disease
African swine fever	Equine infectious anaemia	Paramyxovirus of pigeons
Anthrax	Equine viral arteritis	Rabies (classical)
Aujeszky's Disease	Equine viral encephalomyelitis	Rift valley fever
Avian influenza (bird flu)	Enzootic bovine leukosis	Rinderpest (cattle plague)
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy	Epizootic haemorrhagic virus disease	Scrapie
Bluetongue	Epizootic lymphangitis	Sheep Scab
Bovine TB	Foot and Mouth Disease	Sheep Pox
Brucellosis	Glanders and Farcy	Swine Influenza
Chronic Wasting Disease	Goat Plague	Swine vesicular disease
Classical swine fever	Goat Pox	Teschen disease
Contagious equine metritis	Lumpy skin disease	Vesicular stomatitis
Contagious agalactia		Warble Fly
Contagious bovine pleuro-pneumonia		West Nile virus
Contagious epididymitis (Brucella ovis)		

Further information on these and other diseases can be found [here](#) on the Welsh Government website.

## Annex B - Glossary

The following will provide you with an explanation of the abbreviations and some of the terms used within the plan.

<b>A</b>	
ACTSO	Association of Chief Trading Standards Officers
ADDI	Animal Demography and Disease Informatics
ADPB	Animal Disease Policy Branch
ADPG	Animal Disease Policy Group
ADR	European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road
AF&M	Agriculture Food and Marine
AHS	African Horse Sickness
AHWFG	Animal Health and Welfare Framework Group
AI	Avian Influenza
Animal Keeper	Includes anyone who keeps an animal/animals (birds are also covered by the term ) for any purpose – e.g. livestock, pet
APHA	Animal and Plant Health Agency
APHEA	Animal & Plant Health Evidence & Analysis
<b>B</b>	
BVA	British Veterinary Association
<b>C</b>	
C&D	Cleansing and Disinfection
Category 1 and 2	Emergency responder as defined in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/36/pdfs/ukpga_20040036_en.pdf">https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/36/pdfs/ukpga_20040036_en.pdf</a>
CCG	Civil Contingencies Group
CCS	Civil Contingencies Secretariat (UK Cabinet Office)
CDCC	Central Disease Control Centre
CGU	Containerised Gassing Units
CMO	Chief Medical Officer
COBR	Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms
Comms	Communications
COV	Contingency Official Veterinarian
CPD	Contingency Planning Division (APHA)
CRIP	Commonly Recognised Information Picture
CSA	Chief Scientific Adviser
CSF	Classical Swine Fever
CVO (UK)	Chief Veterinary Officer (UK)
CVO (W)	Chief Veterinary Officer (Wales)
<b>D</b>	
D2R2	Disease Briefing, Decision Support, Ranking and Risk Assessment Database
DAERA	Department of Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs for Northern Ireland (DAERA)
DCS	Disease Control Strategy

DCVO	Deputy Chief Veterinary Officer, Director Defra Animal Health: Surveillance, Global Trade and Zoonoses
Defra	Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
DERC	Disease Emergency Response Committee
DH	Department of Health (UK)
DHSS	Department of Health & Social Services
DRT	Disease Reporting Team
<b>E</b>	
EA	Environment Agency
EC	European Commission
ECC (W)	Emergency Co-ordination Centre (Wales)
EDC	Exotic Disease Control (Defra)
EDPRT	Exotic Disease Policy Response Team (Defra)
EET (AD)	Emergency Executive Team (Animal Diseases)
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
ERMAS	Emergency Readiness Management Assurance Scheme
ESA	Environmental Services Association
ESNR	Economy, Skills and Natural Resources
EU	European Union
ExCo	Emergency Executive Committee
<b>F</b>	
Fabra	Food Chain and Biomass Renewables Association
FAnGR	Farm Animal Genetic Resources Committee
FCELG	Food Chain Emergency Liaison Group
Final (Secondary) Cleansing and Disinfection	After preliminary cleansing and disinfection, the cleansing (including disposal of manure, bedding etc.), degreasing, washing and disinfecting of premises to remove the infective agent, reduce the level of it, such that recrudescence will not occur on restocking.
FMD	Foot and Mouth Disease
FOB	Forward Operations Base
FPU	Food Policy Unit (Defra)
FSA	Food Standards Agency
FUW	Farmers Union of Wales
<b>G</b>	
GB	Great Britain
GIS	Geographic Information Systems
<b>H</b>	
HCC	Hybu Cig Cymru – Meat Promotion Wales
HoFD	Head of Field Delivery Wales (APHA)
HQ	Headquarters
HR	Human Resources
HSC	Head of Strategic Communications
<b>I</b>	
IAHER	International Animal Health Emergency Reserve
IMT	Information Management and Technology
IP	Infected Premises

<b>J – K</b>	
JRLO	The Armed forces Joint Regional Liaison Officer
<b>L – M</b>	
LA	Local Authority
LEVEL 1 and 2	As defined in the Pan-Wales Response Plan <a href="https://gov.wales/docs/resilience/publications/180116-pan-wales-en-v1.pdf">https://gov.wales/docs/resilience/publications/180116-pan-wales-en-v1.pdf</a>
LGPS	Local Government and Public Services Department
LHB	Local Health Board
LRF	Local Resilience Forum
LSRA	Legal Services Rural Affairs
<b>M</b>	
MACA	Military Assistance to Civilian Authority
<b>N</b>	
ND	Newcastle Disease
NDCC	National Disease Control Centre
NDOMS	Notifiable Disease Outbreak Management System
NEEG	National Emergency Epidemiology Group
NEG	National Expert Group
NFU (W)	National Farmers Union of Wales
NP	Defra Network Procurement
NPCC	National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC)
NRW	Natural Resources Wales
NSC (THRC)	National Security Council (Threats, Hazards, Resilience and Contingencies)
NSC(THRC) (O)	National Security Council (Threats, Hazards, Resilience and Contingencies) (Officials)
<b>O</b>	
OAG	Outbreak Advisory Group
OCG	Outbreak Coordination Group
OCVO	Office of the Chief Veterinary Officer (WG)
OD	Outbreak Director
OFFC	Official Feed and Food Controls
OIE	Office International des Epizooties (Also known as the World Animal Health Organisation)
OSR	Outbreak Skills Register
OV	Official Veterinarian
<b>P - Q</b>	
PATOK	Protection of Animals at Time of Killing
PCR	Polymerase Chain Reaction
PERTCO	Network Procurement Central Outbreak Team
PHE CRCE	Public Health England Centre for Radiation, Chemical and Environmental Hazards
PHW	Public Health Wales
“pre-emptive” or “preventative cull” or “firebreak cull”	This involves the culling of animals which are not on infected premises and are not dangerous contacts or necessarily exposed to the disease, in order to prevent the wider spread of disease. Use of this power is described by a Disease Control (Slaughter) Protocol as required by the Animal Health Act 1981. Policies on the use of this power are described in control strategies.

Preliminary Disinfection	Biosecurity procedures put in place during the culling and disposal of animals and the initial treatment of contaminated areas of a premises with disinfectant.
PZ	Protection Zone
<b>R</b>	
RADAR	Rapid Analysis and Detection of Animal Related Risk
RCVS	Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons
RDPE	Rural Development Programme for England
RSPCA	Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
R&TA	Resilience & Technical Advisors (APHA)
<b>S</b>	
SAGE	Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies
SCG	Strategic Co-ordinating Group
SCoPAFF	Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed (European Commission)
SG	Scottish Government
SIR	Security, Intelligence and Resilience Directorate (Cabinet Office)
Sitrep	Situation Report
SZ	Surveillance Zone
<b>T</b>	
TCZ	Temporary Control Zone
<b>U</b>	
UK	United Kingdom
UKRA	United Kingdom Renderers Association
<b>V</b>	
VA	Veterinary Adviser
VAS	Veterinary Advice Service (APHA)
VDP	Veterinary Delivery Partnership
VENDU	Veterinary Exotic Notifiable Diseases Unit (Defra)
VLW	Veterinary Lead Wales
VI	Veterinary Inspector
VRA	Veterinary Risk Assessment
<b>W - Z</b>	
WAHID	World Animal Health Information Database
WAOM	Wales Admin Operations Manager
WATOK	Welfare of Animals at Time of Killing
WCCC	Wales Civil Contingencies Committee
WLGA	Welsh Local Government Association
WRF	Wales Resilience Forum
WRPT	Wales Resilience Partnership Team
WTO	World Trade Organisation